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This thesis explores the role of public opinion in 
intervention policy. It addresses the question of whether 
public opinion should be a consideration in intervention 
policy, whether past public opinion or support has made a 
difference in intervention policy, and how public attitudes 
towards intervention can best be gauged or predicted. The 
study introduces three factors with which to gauge public 
attitudes: fear of escalation, global/regional reaction, ~nd 
America's liberal value Gystem. The the~is argues that 
public attitudes towards actual or potential intervention 
policy can be measured by applying that policy to these 
three indicators. This argument is tested by applying the 
three factors to two case studies. The first is in Nicara-
gua during the 1983-1984 time frame. The second case is the 
Lebanon intervention from August 1982 through February 1984. 
In both of these cases, public opinion ultimately had a 
large impact on whether and for how long intervention was a 
valid policy option. The chree indicators described also 
mirrored to varying degrees public attitudes towards actual 
or potential intervention policies. Finally, the role of 
Congress as a conduit for public opinion in the intervention 
decision is explored, with particular emphasis on the ef-
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Heaven help us as a nation if we, once again, indulge in 
the eY-penditure of precious American blood, without a 
clear demonstration of popular support for it. 
Alexander Haig, 1981 
There is a widespread consensus among academic~, sol-
diers, and politicians that Limited Intensity Warfare (LIW) 
has become increasingly important to the United States' 
foreign policy. 1 This area of wa~fare, as a subset of Low 
Intensity Conflict (LIC), received increasing amounts of 
attention throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. Several 
factors have combined to make many regions of t.he globe 
simultaneously more important and more dangerous for the 
UnitP.d States, a~ recent events in Iraq have so amply demon-
strated. And while much attention is being paid to the 
sharp end of the spear, i.e. technical and tactical means in 
LIW, relativaly little study has been devoted to the all-
important task o~ g~rne~ing and maintaining public sup~ort 
for intervention policy. 
Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan produced what many 
consider the landmark study of U.S. intervention in 1977. 2 
This study examined over 200 interventions between 1945 and 
1975, measuring the effects of "time, region, type of polit-
icQl situation at which the U.S. military action was direct-
1 
ed, the level of involvement by the Soviet Union and China, 
and the participation by other actors." 3 None of these 
factors captured the role of public opinion in intervention 
policy. Philip Zeliko~ continued and updated the 
Blechman/Kaplan work, studying 44 interventions between the 
years 1975 and 1982. 4 Bis methodology followed that of 
Blechman/Kaplan, and concluded that success depends on 
realistic objectives rather than the level of force used. 
This methodology and conclusion, again, ignore the role of 
domestic public attitudes towards intervention policy, and 
the role of those attitudes in forming and influencing that 
policy. 
Herbert Tillema came closer to recognizing the role of 
popular opinion in intervention with his 1973 work Appeal ,tQ 
.f..2.I:£..~. 5 Tillema identifi~d numerous constraints on U.S. 
intervention policy, many of which revolved around the idea 
of American values and resultant domestic attitudes influ-
encing the policy methods and objectives that would be 
available to U.S. decision-makers. 6 Again, though, the idea 
of measuring public attitudes towards !ntervention policy, 
and identifying the factors that influence those attitudes, 
does not rec~ive explicit attention. 
The United States hns shown a varying propensity to 
interv~ne militarily in other countries, especially since 
Vietnam. There are obviously many reasons for this varying 





above, as well as many others. But one of the most impor-
tant determinant£ of successful LIW policy, and the topic of 
this study, is the role public opinion plays in the inter-
vention dP.cision. 
A. INTERVENTION AND POPULAR CONSENSUS 
It has become axiomatic to say that a public consensus 
is required fo~ the United States to engage in sustained 
intervention abroad. Short successful operations as in 
I 
Panama can arguably be justified after the fact. If the 
intervention is over before public opinion is aroused, then 
it is obvious that opinion will not affect the operation's 
outcome, although the decision to intervane may be ques-
tioned eventually. But longer or larger com.mitme~ts require 
public support in this country. This increased importance 
for public opinion to foreign policy in general, and inter-
vention in particular, has been recognized by the executive 
and congressional branches. President R~agan's appeals to 
public opinion, for exam?le, were prolific and effective, at 
least over the short term7 • Meanwhile, the Congress has 
responded to increased public interest in foreign policy 
issues by reasserting its own powe?"s in that arena. 
There is evidence that as much as ~ighty percent of the 
public could be currently characterized as knowledgeable on 
a given foreign policy issue, although the number will 
fluctuate among issues and over time. This number compares 
3 
to ttk.nowledgeable" lev~ls of a~ low as twenty percent in the 
years following Vietnam8 • Whil~ eighty percent does seem a 
bit optimistic, an overall increased awareness and interest 
among the public has influenced foreign policy in general, 
and interventio~ decisions in partic~lar. It is important, 
then, to understand the sources of public attitudes towards 
intervention. such insight may help predict whether an 
intervention decision will be approved by the American 
people, which arguably increases its chances of success. 
Or, more importantly, an understanding of public attitude 
sources co11ld help structure intervention policy in a frame-
work that will be acceptable to the American public. 
What are the sources of public attituces towards inter-
vention? The pioneers ¢f puLlic cpinion research identified 
many root sources and influences en public opinion, includ-
ing family, religion, educat~on, etc. These factor.c; fern 
the basic belief systems of individuals within th~ pu~lic as 
a whole. 9 These belief systems ir. turn form the bdsis for 
opinion o« particular issues, such as intervention. But 
opinion by itself is meaningless to decision-raak~rs. What 
does matter is whether opinion will move the public towards 
or away from supporting their policies. To gain this in- • 
sight it is necessary to find concrete issues or factors 
within a particular policy question and examine how those 




Obviously "the public" is not a single-minded monolith, with 
one set of beliefs and attitudes10 • But it would be im-
mensely useful to decision-makers if a few issues within a 
policy ~uestion could be identified th3t capture those 
factors that will most affect public attitudes towards the 
varicus options available. Beliefs and feelings are diffi-
cult to quantify, and even more difficult to project accu-
rately onto a particular issue. But if one can identify the 
components within an issue that will af1ect beliefs and 
feelings, it will aid in attempts at predicting how that 
issuP. will be received, and whether or not it will be sup-
port1=d. 
Military intervention is certainly an issue that affects 
the American psyche. But, as was stated earlier, the United 
States has shown a great variance in its prcpensity to 
intervene. If public support is a part of the intervention 
decision (as this study argues}, then \t should be possible 
to identify factors that af!ect that support. This can be 
done with an eye towards predicting levels of support for a 
given policy. Or, more importantly, decision-makers 
equipped with an understanding of the sources of public 
attitudes towards intervention can use that under&tanding in 
their framing of intorvention policy. This is not meant as 
a pre~cription for cynical or manipulative tactics to garner 
support for an other#ise unpopular venture. The America~ 
public is part of the intervention decision, like it or not. 
5 
An understanding of public attitudes - both sources and 
effects - towards intervention should result in better poli-
cy. Sometimes that will mean more intervention, sometimes 
less. But success is not measured by wh~ther U.S. troops 
land on foreign soil. It is measured by whether the bene-
fits of intervention policy outweigh the costs. The bene-
fits of a policy advocating non-intervention are often 
great, just as the price of intervention is often justified. 
B. ORGANIZATION AND METHODOLOGY 
The object of this study is to describe and demonstrate 
the effects of three primary factors that can be used to 
predict, gauge, and possibly influence public attitudes 
towards intervention policy. The study will also analyze 
the m~nner in which opinion influences policy through the 
legislative and executive branches. Ultimately, policy will 
follow opinion. Unfortunately, poor understanding of this 
fact and also of the facto~s that influence opinion have 
often led to costly mistakes before publi~ desires were 
translated into policy. 
The study will begin by describing a two-stage model for 
intervention decision-making. The first stage uses a ra-
tional cost/benefit analysis of measurable and known factors 
surrounding the potential intervention, temporarily ignoring 
the effects of public opinion. 




the three factors that have arguably mirrored opinion in the 
past and will continue to do ro in the future. These fac-
tors: fear of escalation, global/regional reaction, and 
liberal values; will be described individually in terms of 
both their sources, and their effects on opin~on. 
'.l'he next step will be to demonstrate that these three 
"Sliding Factors"* do indeed influence public opinion, and 
that the opiniou these factors influence (or ~irror) does 
precede a change in policy. It does not require a great 
leap of faith to then assert that public attitudes eventual-
ly influence intervention policy. Two cases will be pre-
sented where this does indeed seem to be the case. First, 
the Uni~ed States and Nicaragua see~ed headed for armed 
conflict in the fall of 1984 when the Reagan administration 
accused the Sandinistas of importing MIG-21 jet aircraft. 
overwhelming public dissatisfaction with this potentiality 
arguably played a large role in influencing the President 
not to pursue that course of action, as well as ennobling 
the Congress to force changes in the administration's Cen-
tral .American policies. 
In the second case, U.S. intervention in Lebanon in the 
years 1982-1984 became increasingly unpopular as costs 
soared and objectives became muddled and untenable. Again, 
*so named because they are not static among interventions, 
or even over time within a si:ngle intervention. 
7 
the administration eventually altered its intervention 
policy to a course tha~ paralleled public attitudes. 
Finally, it is important to understand the process 
through which public opinion is translated into policy. 
Congress acts as a conduit between the public and the Presi-
dent, filtering at times, amplifying at other times public 
attitudes towards intervention policy. Chapter V will 
present an argument that Congress is an inefficient agent of 
public will, and should take measures to reassert its role 
in intervention policy. 
8 
• 
II. A MODEL FOR DECISION-MAKING 
The intervention dacision can be seen as a two stage 
procesR. First, a rational analysis of measurable static 
factors can be made with the goal of eliminati~J as many of 
the unknown5 in the intervention decision as ~~ possible. 
These variables can be called Core Factors. And seco~d, an 
analysis of the factors that affect public support for 
intervention can be analyzed, with the goal of determining 
whether or not support is available for intervention and if 
not, how or if that support can be garnered. These varia-
bles are often neither static nor measurable. For this 
reason, the term Sliding Factors is an appropriate label. 
This study is most concerned with these Sliding Factors and 
their influence on public attitudes towards intervention. 
But it is also useful to briefly introduce the rational 
analysis, or Core Factors, and recognize that public opinion 
is not the sole determinant of intervention policy. 
A. CORE FACTORS 
Core Factors appeal to the rational ~ature of m~n. In 
the puzzle of war, theae are the pieces that can be laid out 
beforehand, poked and prodded, weighed and pondered until, 
eventually, a sane and justifiable estimate of their effects 
on the conflict's conduct and outcome can be made. They 
9 
appeal to the realist belief that "foreign policy is a 
state's reasoned response to international imperatives.nll 
Core Factors are generally static over the course of the 
potential conflict, so their effects on the decision to 
intervene will depend on solid knowledge rather than guess-
work. This point is very important because it prevents 
speculation and misguided perceptions from affecting ration-
al decisions based upon these factors. 
Core Factors are used to answer one antecedent and two 
primary questions. The antecedent question is "How will the 
war be fought?" This question addresses the war's conduct, 
i.e. strategies, tactics, and wsapons employed. Once deci-
sion-makers know ho~ the conflict will be fought, they can 
address the primary questions of whether victory is possi-
ble, and ~hether a victory would justify the costs incurred 
in its pursuit. 
Certainly nothing in war is totally predictable, and 
there is a difference between "real warh and "war on paper," 
as the ninetaenth century strategist Carl von Clausewitz so 
aptly described with his concept of friction. But because 
Core Factors are static and at least somewhat tangible, 
their potential etfects can be predicted on a best/worst 
case basis, and quite often with much more confidence than 
that. This point is best illustrated with the most 
straightforward Core Factor, geography. 
10 
l. Geography 
Geography affects the conduct more than the outcome 
of LIW. Many of its effects are intuitively obvious, but 
some are a bit more subtle. For simplicity, all of geogra-
phy's effects may be broken into four broad categories. 
T~e first geographic category is strategic location. 
It matters if a potential conflict area is strategically 
important to the United States or, conversely, to another 
large power. An area in close proximity to U.S. territory, 
for example, may be examined in a different light than one 
further away. Conversely, an area of potential conflict 
that borders on a power like the Soviet Union could alter 
the probability and extent of U.S. involvement. During the 
1967 and 1973 Arab/Israeli wars, for example, the U.S. 
response was tailored as much to the potential Soviet threat 
as to the hot war on landl2 . 
Another geographic effect is accessibility. The 
type and extent of U.S. forces' j~volvement will certainly 
depend at least in part on their ability to physically enter 
the arena. That U.S. planners realize this fact is evi-
denced by their commitment to a force structure capable of 
projecting power vast distances and into most re9ions. The 
mobility and flexibility necessary to do this remains a high 
priority for U.S. decision-makers13 . 
Still another geographi~ effect is terrain. It is 
11 
obvious that a desert war would be fought differently than a 
jungle war. Different equipment, tactics, and training 
would be required. The self-evidence of this fact belies 
its importance. Whether or not U.S. forces are trained and 
ecr~ipped to fight in the local terrain should play a crucial 
role in determining whether or not to commit them. 
Finally, weather can be considered as a s~bset of 
terrain. Extreme weather conditions require specialized 
training and equipment, as U.S. troops discov~red while 
operating in the Saudi desert14 . This will certajnly affect 
the conduct of a potential conflict and, depending upon how 
well ~raining and equipment serve U.S. force~, the outcome 
could be affected as well. 
All of these geographic factors can be examined 
prior to a U.S. commitment and their effects on the conduct 
and outcome of American involvemsnt predicted with consider-
able accuracy. 
2. Elements of National Power 
Elements of power include political, economic, and 
military power, as well as alliances and agreements with 
other nations. U.S. decision-makers should understand both 
the sou~ces and the stability of these elements. This will 
allow the United States to concentrate on the most important 
element(s) (what Clausewitz called the center of gravity) to 
achieve the political objectives of the war. 
These factors serve as measures of strength and 
12 
vulnerability. Their sources and stability should affect 
how the U.S. pursues its objectives and whether these objec-
tives are attainable. Many of the factors are measurable 
and their sources and vulnerabilities should rsmain rela-
tively static throughout the conflict. 
a) Political 
The first area to consider is political power. 
First, the stability of a government should be important 
because a potentially unstable regime may be more vulnerable 
to an LIW strategy that seeks to undermine it directly. 
But more importantly, the source of political 
power should be a factor in LIW strategy. It is difficult 
to successfully attack a political power that is based ~n 
ganuine public support and effectively satisfies the needs 
of its constituents. But a power based on oppression and 
coercion may have exploitable weaknesses. 
Political power's effects will depend upon 
whether United States forces are assisting a regime against 
an insurgency or they are fighting the government itself15 • 
Briefly, if the U.S. is assisting a government, successful 
intervention may depend upon whether the host government is 
legitim~te and effective16 • If, on the other hand, U.S. 
forces are fighting the government itself, they will be most 
effectivs against an unstable regime. 
13 
b) Economic 
The second element of national power is econom-
ics. Again, sources and stability are the keys. Sources 
include such factors as self-rel~ance and level of develop-
ment. The former factor affects sanction or blockade op-
tions available, and the latter aifects strategies and 
weapons that will be useful. 
Economic stability deals with the vulnerability 
of the sources. If an LIW policy includes attempts to 
inflict economic damage, then the target economy must have 
some sort of Achilles' heel. The target economy may be 
subject to disruption through bombing or other direct mili-
tary action. or, it may be vulnerable to sanctions or 
blockade. 17 Again, Desert Storm provides a current illus-
tration. The major domestic debate revolved around whet.her 
the coalition should give sanctions an opportunity to work 
or whether force should be used. Events have shown that 
force was effective in ejecting Iraq from Kuwait, but that 
does not negate the possibility of sanctio~s being effec-
tive18. 
c) Military 
The third element of power is military strength. 
A potential foe's military power will certainly affect the 
conduct and outcome of U.S. strategy. The size and sophis-
tication of the adversary's military will dictate the re-













































World arsenals grew at alarming rate$ throughout the 1980s. 
Arms sales to Third World countries between 1983 
and 1987 totaled some 50 major warships, 242 supersonic air-
craft, and 2300 surface-to-air missiles. 19 Also, some 40 
nations currently have or are actively seeking ballistic or 
cruise missile technology20 . This certair.ly compl.~.cates 
America's ability to project power. 
It is comforting to note that U.S. political and 
military leaders have planned for and maintained a commit-
ment t~ the types of forces required for LIW. The President 
and Secretary of Defense have both placed Third World tai-
lored forces high on their military priorities21 • And the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff have concluded that the U.S. has the 
p~ysical ability to "prosecute s~tisfactorily any regional 
conflicts, provided it has the political will to act prompt-
ly and decisively and the national will to endure the con-
flict.1122 Admittedly that is a large proviso and its impli-
cations will be examined in later sections. 
d) Alliances 
The final element of power affecting LIW is al-
liances, or what Clausewitz called communities of interest. 
Alliances can give a state power and influence out of pro-
portion to its indigenous resources. This power may prevent 
U.S. intervention if it is too great. Or the U.S. may balk 
at provoking the other alliance partner in some cases. But 
15 
alliances may provide exploit.able weaknesses, too. 
Alliances provide vulnerabilities because they 
call for cooperation between sovereign states. But this 
cooperation will only continue so long as it remains in both 
parties' interests to do so. Again, Clausewitz recognized 
that "One country may s~pport another'$ cause, but will 
never take it so seriously as it takes its own." 23 This 
fact was recognized in ancient times as the Spartans at-
temptad to separate Athens from her allies. 24 And it was 
certainly recognized by the North Vietnamese as they real-
ized they could not take the south as long as Americans 
opposed them on the battlefield. The North's strategy 
attacked American public support for the alliance at home 
rather than U.S. soldiers in the field. This effort was 
further aided by a faulty U.S. assessment of the "cownonali-
ty of interest " between the Viet con g and North 
Vietnamese25 • Still later, Gorbachev appeared to be intent 
on decoupling the U.S. from the Western alliance through 
anns control and peace propaganda. 
In any case, unless there is a return to the 
secret diplomacy of the 18th and 19th centuries, alliances 
and "communities of interests" will bo known prior to poten-
tial U.S. intervention and these alliances• probable ef-
fects, as well as potential vulnerabilities, should be 
calculable by planners and decision-makers. 
Identifying and estimating a potential fou's ele-
16 
'\ 
Identifying and estimating a potential foe's ele-
ments of power are necessary steps prior to the intervention 
decision. These elements, by their sources and stability, 
point out the center of gravity, or most vulnerable point of 
the target state. This information is vital to determine 
how to fight as well as the likelihood of success. And 
because these elements and their effects are measurable 
prior to the conflict, they can be inputs to the r~tional 
cost/benefit process that decides whether intervention is 
justified. 
3. Interests 
Interests play a vital role in determining the 
potential ccnduct and outcome of a U.S. intervention. Real 
interests are constant in the sho~t term so their effects 
should be predictable. Perceived or represented interests, 
alternatively, are very pliant over the course of even a 
short conflict and will be discussed in Section B. 
Since "The political object .• [determines) both the 
military objective .•• and the amount of effort it 
rPquires," 26 real interests will (or should) determine the 
objects of war and serve as inputs to strategy. Interests 
will also determine the willingness to pay for these objec-
tives because LIW, as the name implies, is limited not ju~t 
by the objectives and the ability to inflict pain, but it is 
also limited by the tolerance for pain, or tolerance for 
potenti3l pain that may be administ~rea27. 
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A sound strategy based upon real interests and the 
predicted effects oi other core factors (geography, elements 
of power) should provide preliminary answers to thP ques-
tions "How will we fight?" and "Can we win?" Careful analy-
sis of these factors should also enable preliminary calcula-
tion of the costs involved. These costs can then be com-
pared to the beTh~fits gained from the objectives to deter-
mine if victory is justified given the probable costs. 
4. Reactive Will· 
Thjs broad framework.omits many particulars by 
design. But one glaring particular affecting conduct and 
outcome must be addressed: the enemy's objectives and 
strategies in the face of U.S. involvement. Jirst, an 
enemy's objectives will affect his strategies just as U.S. 
interests affect its strategy. But when intereots and 
strategies collide, an iterative process takes rlace wherein 
each side attempts to account for the new inputs of the 
other. The enemy will react to U.S. intervention, so U.S. 
planners and decision-makers must consider second ana third 
order effects of their potential actions. Again, many of 
these effects are subject to rational analysis and, while 
nothing can be certain in war, reasonable analysis should 
provide preliminary ans~ers to the all-important questions 
"Can we win?" and "Is it worth it?" 
s. Summary 
There are many facets of state relationships and war 
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that cannot be measured. But some aspects clearly are both 
~easurable and ,redictable to varying degrees. These are 
the Core Factors. Core Factors look at what is known and 
measurable. They seek to eliminate a~ many variables as 
possible so that when the more intangible Sliding Factors 
are considered, there is a base of knowledge upon which to 
stand. Alternatively, if a thorough examination of Core 
Factors yields the answer that a war cannot be won, or the 
costs of victory would not be justified, then there is no 
reason to move ~n to the next, more difficult step of gar-
nering and maintaining public support for intervention. If, 
however, ~nalysis of Co~e Factors does reveal that victory 
\~ attainable, ~nd at a cost commensurate with our national 
interests, then the next step is to gain and insure public 
support for the actions daemed neces~ary to prevail. 
B. SLirING FACTORS 




no end of feeling, and we mistake it for 
And out of i~ we get an aggregation which we 
boon. It is held in reverence. It settles 
Some think it the voice of God. 
Mark Twain 
It seems public opinion held much the same sway over 
Twain's 19th century America as it does now. Democracies 
are unique in their rP.liance upon public support for sus-
tained intervention. There is a clear recognition, espe-
cially after Vietnam, that the U.S. n~eds strong popular 
support and a consensus of important political actors to 
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sustain U.S. military intervention28 . 
/ 
/ 
~liding Factors address this required public support. 
They influence initial and c~ntinuing support for interven-
tion by altering the perceived current or potential 
cost/benefit ratio of fighting. The key word here is per-
ceived because, unlike Core Factors, Sliding Factors may not 
be rational or correct. They are feelings rather than 
tangible objects or logical concepts. 
Sliding Factors also will change as the conflict wears 
on. Sometimes change will be uncontrollable and unexpected. 
But more importantly, some of these factors may also be 
manipulated to increase or ·decrease support for the con-
flict. This is why decision-makers would do well to recog-
nize and address these factors' effects. At the least, 
seemingly random or irrational swings in these factors ~an 
undermine support for a conflict that, according to Core 
Factors, is worthwhile. At worst, these factors may be 
manipulated by some party who understands their effects and 
wishe~ to directly alter public opinion. These effects and 
their susceptibility to manipulation are perhaps best illus-
trated by the first Sliding Factor - fear of escalation. 
1. Fear of Escalation 
This factor addresses the psychological effects of 
potential vertical, horizontal, or temporal escalation. 
There are two distinct aspects to this factor. The first 





escala~e. But while the psychology of escalation is c~r­
tainly affected by capability - if there were no capability 
there would be no fear - a nation's propensity to escalate 
is the least known and more important source of uncertainty. 
Herman Kahn, in his book On Escalation, describes an 
escalation ladder that provides a useful metaphor. 29 Kahn's 
ladder contained forty four rungs and six· thresholds. The 
work described through this ladder a process in which small 
escalatory steps are taken to a given threshold at which 
time a reassessment of costs and goals is necessary before 
proceeding up to the next stage of warfare. The ability and 
the willingness of a leader to climb this ladder will cer-
tainly affect the perceiv~d and potential costs of the 
conflict and thereby the level of public support, even in 
LIW. 
Fear of escalation can be manipulated by anyone with 
an understanding of American culture. A common fear is that 
a conflict might get out of control or that its ~osts may 
exceed the value of its original objectivas, as in WWI or 
even the cold war30 . This fear can be altered by raising 
the stakes, or even by seemingly irrational acts that cause 
uncertainty. Saddam Hussein attempted to raise the stakes 
of the Gulf crisis by publicly loading aircraft with chemi-
cal bombs and threatening to walk on the dead of his adver-
saries. But Israel illustrated how to downplay fear of 
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escalation through its civil defense programs and test 
firing of the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system. The 
Patriot missile system also played a large role in quelling 
escalatory fears among the public that were based upon 
Iraq's SCUD ballistic missiles. The aim of each party in 
these examples was to alter perceptions about current and 
potential costs, with the ultimate goal of eroding on the 
one hand, or maintaining on the other, public confidence and 
support. 
2. Global/Regional Reaction 
This factor, like the other Sliding Factors, forms 
American public opinion by appealing to both rational and 
irrational psychological reactions to U.S. interven~ion. 
World opinion will affect U.S. popular support in three 
primary ways. First, the world response to U.S. interven-
tion can affect the probable success of that intervention. 
The American public knows that global and regional supp•::>rt 
(or at least apathy) are desir~ble prerequisites to success-
ful intervention. This is undoubtedly a major reason the 
U.S. sought and obtained the Arab League's and the U.N. 's 
endorsements for Operatiuns Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 
among other interventions. These andorsements added not 
just legitimacy to the operation, but also moral and materi-
al support that increased the probability of success and de-
creased potential costs. Initial and subsequent levels of 
publ\c support for the operation were due in part at least 
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to this international cooperation. 
But international reaction can also fuel the flames 
of isolationism in this country. Even though Senator Van-
denberg's "great moats" protecting America's shores of the 
1930s have become small rivers, many in the United States 
have sought to once again heed George Washington's advice 
and avoid foreign entanglements. More specifically, many 
Americans do not wish to take on foreign adventures where 
the risks are almost unilaterally American, but the benefits 
are widely distributed. The effects of this affront to 
"fair play" can be channeled into under.nining support for 
U.S. intervention. The Japanese ar.d Germans, for example, 
came under heavy criticism in this country for their alleged 
reluctance to foot "their share" of the Desert Storm bill. 
Had this reluctance been more widespread, it may well have 
affected public support for U.S. policy. 
This leads to the tnird broad influence of interna-
tional reaction on public support: the idea of popular 
consent. Majority rule is part of tr.e American political 
and ethnic culture. It goes against this culture to inter-
vene contrary to world opinion. That is not to say we have 
not or should not ignore world opinion in some cases. w~ 
have and should. But contravening popular opinion requires 
justification, so the intervention must be presented in a 
way that justifies ignoring worl6 opinion. These justifica-
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tions are almost always value-oriented, end as such will be 
addressed in the "Values" section of this chapter. 
Global/Regional reactions to U.S. LIW involvement 
will vary among cases according to mutual interesto at stake 
and the perceived legitimacy of U.S. actions. The concept 
of mutual interests at stake is fairly straightforward. 
Members of the international community will, all else being 
equal, support U.S. intervention if that action serves or at 
least does not t~reaten their interests. Two simple cases 
illustrate this point. The world reaction to potential U.S. 
intervention in Nicaragua was very negative in the 1980s, 
even among many allies. Few mutual interests were at stake. 
The reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers and subsequent naval 
protection, howe•1er, was very popular, especially among oil 
importing states. To quote Mark Twain once more: "You tell 
me whar a man gits his corn pone, en I'll tell you what is 
pinions is. 1131 Interests outlast friendships among states, 
and mutual interests will shape international reactions to 
U.S. for.eign policy decisions. 
World reaction will also vary according to the 
perceived legitimacy of U.S. intervention. Historical 
empathies and animosities play a role to be sure, but there 
are deeper threats to legitimacy that may be exercised. 
Much of the international community has developed high 
expectations of morality for U.S. behavior. It has been 
argued these expectations, along with natural sympathy for 
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the underdog, negatively affect world reaction to American 
intervention and compel U.S. leaders to articulate compel-
ling justification for committing combat forces 32 • 
Whatever the source, there are opportunities to 
manipulate the effects of Global/Regional reactions and 
influence domestic support towards or away from intervention 
support. First, the international reaction itself can be 
manipulated by addressing its sources, as they were de-
scribed above. This can be done by either presenting the 
intervention in a light that invokes mutual interests, or by 
justifying it on moral grounds. Both of these methods have 
been used in the past with varying results. 
The second option is to manipulate not the world's 
reaction, but the U.S. public's response to that reaction. 
This can be done by de-legitimatizing the -orld reaction as 
self-serving or short-sighted, while simultaneously extoll-
ing the moral and/or practical virtues of the preferred 
course of action. This method cannot, however, ignore the 
final Sliding Factor's effects. In the final analysis, U.S. 
public opinion towards or away from support for intervention 
will depend upon the intervention's appeal to or repulsion 
of America's liberal values. 
3. Liberal Values 
The final Sliding Factor is the American value 
system itself. This is the root of public opinion and, 
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while values themselves will not change during a conflict, 
perceptions based upon those values will. All effective 
appeals for support and voices of dissension must in some 
way invoke American values33 • Intervention must be justi-
fiable to the liberal ethic if it hopes to invoke the public 
will, and public will is necessary to sustain support. 
Legitimacy of the objective and the means employed to 
achieve that objective are all-important in a democracy. 
But it is often difficult to ascertain right from wrong. 
Death and dastruction are obviously bad, but they are also 
* justifiable in some cases. These cases, as well as their 
opposites, are the products of a value system that must be 
addressed by decision-makers wishing to predict or influence 
public opinion. 
American values are largely based upon the liberal 
ethic34 • Michael Howard argues that Americans identify not 
with an ethnic group or shared historical experience, but 
with a value system. The liberal creed has always been a 
part of that system35 . The reasoning has been that wars 
should not be fought for politicians, statesmen, or armor-
ers, but for liberal democratic ideals and in response to 
public opinion. Unfortunately, many prior U.S. interven-
* This argument conjures up Saint Augustine's notion of Just 
War, which lists conditions under which war is permissibl~. 
Not surprisingly, The liberal ethic's view of permissible 
war closely parallels that of Just War, as will be discussed 
in the following paragraphs. 
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tions have run afoul of this creed. 
U.S. decision-makers lose public support when either 
the perceived potential costs or the objectives of interven-
tion run counter to American values. Costs alone can be 
repulsive but not necessarily fatal to values, depending on 
the objectives at stake. 
Democracies have shown an almost uncanny willingness 
to bleed where their ideals are at stake. Frederick II said 
of citizen soldiers, "with such troops one would defeat the 
world, wer~ victory not as fatal to them as to their ene-
mies. "36 But high costs in the face of the often-times 
extremely limited objectives of LIW may not be acceptable in 
the United States. The sight of body bags returning home 
and devastation in the "host" country may raise the per-
ceived costs of intervention beyond acceptable limits. The 
United States is especially susceptible to this phenomenon 
because, to paraphrase General Fred c. Weyland, the American 
way of war is especially nasty because we use "things" while 
opponents use people37 . Ironically, General Weyland went on 
to invoke Pericles by stating "there ~re worse things than 
~ar." But neither he nor anyone else was able to convince 
the Ji...Jerican public that there were worse things than the 
war about which these remarks were made (Vietnam). 
The Vietnam experience illustrates another factor 
that may, however irrationally, raise the public's percep-
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tion of expected costs. The last war's legacy, especially 
if it was a failure, will certainly affect support for the 
next conflict. A "Vietnam syndrome" or "never again" atti-
tude will impinge on the policy options available and disin-
cline public op1nion to favor new conflict38 • 
American values dictate that the costs of interven-
tion must be justified by legitimate objectives. This means 
that U.S. goals and policy must be cloaked in the beliefs 
and vocabulary of the liberal ethic. One need not go far to 
find examples of this phenomenon. The Truman Doctrine, for 
example, invoked the liberal terminology of "fighting the 
forces of tyranny, Power to the majority, and Freedom to 
all." 39 The same could be said of many regional actions the 
U.S. has brought against the ass\lllled communist monolith, up 
to and including support for Nicaraguan "Freedom fighters." 
Other acceptable justifications for intervention include 
stopping a deadly conflict already in process, requests for 
intervention from (presumably legitimate) host governments, 
and assisting againat some "outside" nation's 
inter.vention40 • Any of these justifications, and probably 
more, may invoke the liberal ethic and slide public opinion 
toward or away from intervention support, especially after 
the initial "rally around the flag" phase has worn off. 
There is one additional lesson that, hopefully, will 
not need to be relearned. When interests or objectives have 
been wrongly attributed or misapplied to American values, 
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the backlash has been severe. The P-ffects of this backlash 
go beyond those discussed above under the last war's legacy. 
Politicians are often caught in a bind. They cannot 
(or should not) jeopardize American support and confidence 
in their political and military institutions by misrepre-
senting interests. But they often must take seemingly 
paradoxical actions to meet real ti1reats; actions which the 
pub 1 i c may not or , for sec u :r it y reasons , cannot 
understand41 . The classic example is a president's decision 
to build up regional forces as a means to deter war. To the 
public, this appears to invite escalation, raising potential 
costs beyond justification. As a result, support for intP.r-
vention could be withdrawn from below, culminating in a 
failed policy and possibly greater costs down the road. But 
the real point of the buildup was to reduce costs by deter-
ring war in the Zirst place. Unfortunately, the public may 
see this as a deception aimed at them rather than at the 
potential enemy. Success in this situation would require an 
astute politician, as well as properly conceived and articu-
lated strategy and objectives - something Edward Luttwak 
perhaps glibly calls "a great rarity in any case, and espe-
cially in the rogue's gallery of the highest political 
leaders."42 
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Alexis de Tocqueville said: 
Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities 
which are peculiar to a denocracy. They require, on the 
contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which 
it is deficient.43 
This section has attempted to describe the difficulties 
of garnering and maintQining public support for U.S. LIW 
involvement. The problem, as de Tocqueville undoubtedly 
realized, is that democracies are as woefully deficient in 
their ability to influence public opinion as they are de-
pendent upon the support that opinion may or may not pro-
duce. 
Sliding Factors influence public opinion, either inten-
tionally or by chance. Unfortunately, since these factors' 
sources and effects are sometimes irrational and unpredict-
able, decision-makers must plan for or hedge ag3inst many 
probable outcomes. But the most intriguing and useful of 
these factors are those that may under some circumstances be 
manipulated to influence opinion toward or away from inter-
vention s~pport. This manipulation may be for legitimate or 
illegitimate ends. That is not important for now. What is 
important is that by examining and understanding these 
factors and their potential effects, public support can be 
altered through rational or irrational appeals invoking 
fear, i~te=ests, ego, and values. Astute decision-makers 
and planners recognize and address these factors in pursuit 
of their foreign policy objectives. 
30 
• 
C. MODEL FOR DECISION-MAKING 
Figure 2.1 presents a model for deciding whether or not 
the United States sho1lld intervene in an LIW situation. The 
model accounts for the two types of tactors presented and 
the capabilities and thought processes they produce, both 
rational and irrational. 
The model is divided into two phases to illustrate the 
two levels of analysis available to decision-makers. The 
first phase is consecutive and flows from one step ~o the 
next culminating in either intervention or withdrawal. The 
second phase is iterative. This phase assumes initial 
intervention, but then must constantly seek and maintain 
public support. If this support i's permanently withdrawn, 
the intervention is (or should be) terminated under most 
circumstances. 
1. Consecutive Process 
The consecutive process is fairly straightforward. 
Decision-~akers are presented with a problem that U.S. 
intervention could conceivably alleviate. Their first step 
i& to perform a rational analysis of Core Factors, holding 
public support constant, to determine 1) Can the U.S. obtain 
its ~bjectives milit~rily? and 2) Will tr.e objectives justi-
fy the expected costs? If the answer to either of these 
questionR is no, they drop out of the process and pursue 
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If, however, these questions are both answered in the af-
firmative, decision-makers must see~c public support for the 
proposed intervention. 
If support is forthcoming, as it generally is in the 
beginning, intervention can proceed.* If, however, publir: 
support is not forthcoming, decision-makers mu:st address and 
attem}"lt to influen::e whichever Sliding Factcr (s) is/are 
eroding suppcrt. This will generally be an intense effort 
by the President and his followers to easa fears of poten-
tial co~ts and invoke liberal democratic values to gain 
support for the proposed course of action. If this effort 
is not successful, intervention should not be initiated 
except in extreme cases wher~ the Na~ional Command Authority 
has absolute confidence that theirs is the proper course of 
action. Even in that case, though, the it~rative process 
will begin. 
2. Iterative Process 
The iterathe process !:'-".'gins after intervention has 
been initiated and persists until U.S. forces are nc longer 
in combat. This process a~sumes that sJpport for interven-
tion must ba maintained. If it is not, decision-makers will 
be oblige<! to withdraw U.S. furces. 
• " ••• there wure great numbers of young men who had never 
been in a war and w~re consequently far from unwilling to 
join in thi~ one." Thucydides, ~ Peloponnesian War (New 





Again, if support is not maintained it will be 
because one or more Sliding Factors have changed. 
Decision-makers who wish to continue the intervention must 
addre~s these Sliding Factors in the manner described above 
until either the objective has been achieved or support is 
simply no longer available. If support is not regained, the 
i11tcrvention will generally be ended without achieving the 
original goals, possibly only to have the entire process 
repeated at a later date. 
This simple model represents the processes that 
decision-makers should follow when deciding whether or not 
to commit U.S. combat forces in LIW. It admittedly has some 
limitations. These will be discussed in the concluding 
section of this chapter. But overall, the model and the 
factors provide a framework for decision-making. They 
enable a frame of reference and ~ list of important factors 
for decision-makers to consider prior to committing them-
selves and the nation to war, even a limited one. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has presented a model for decision-making 
that takes into account rational analysis where possible and 
irrational effects where necessary. The Core Factors pre-
sented - geography, elements of power, interests, and reac-
tive will - are all subject to some degree of analysis prior 
to the intervention decision. These factors should remain 
static over the course of the proposed conflict so their 
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manifestations and effects are relatively predictable. Core 
Factors seek to answers the questions "Can we win?" and "Is 
it worth it?" 
Sliding Factors - fear of escalation, global/regional 
reaction, and values - are often irrational and unpredict-
able sources of public opinion. These factors will make or 
break support for intervention. Sliding Factors often 
change unpredictably, but they also are often susceptible to 
manipulation over the course of a conflict. Decision-makers 
must address and seek to influence these factors if they 
wish to successfully gain and maintain support for interven-
tion. Conversely, persons wishing to undermine popular 
support can also seek to manipulate Sliaing Factors for 
their own agendas. Finally, the nature of the conflict 
itself will influence the public's perceptions of these 
factors. 
Core and Sliding Factors combine to form a two-process 
model for decision-making. This model consists of a ratioP-
al analysis of Core Factors followed by an iterative process 
of seeking and maintaining public support through Sliding 
Factors. This process continues until either support is 
irretrievably lost or the intervention's objectives have 
been reached. 
It would be presumptuous and naive to assert this model 
accounts for all the factors involved in the intervention 
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decision. But the model is useful because it gen~rally 
represents and simplifies reality without attempting to 
account for every incident-specific eventuality. If the 
model looks simple and obvious, that is its intent. To 
achieve this simplicity, though, certain limitations must be 
accepted. 
First, the model assumes interests and, therefore, 
objectives are static. This is not always the case for 
objectives, even in a limited conflict. Often, what Luttwak 
calls a "reciprocal reduction in aims" occurs as each side 
lowers its objectives until both are congruent44 • But this 
change in objectives does not necessarily represent changing 
interests. Rather it may be a conscious decision to forego 
some interests in the face of unforeseen costs. It is 
almost inevitable, though, that objectives will change 
"since they are influenced by events and their probable 
outcomes." 45 Hopefully, the probability of lowered objec-
tives will have been hedged against in the original rational 
analysis. 
Another limitation of the model is that it cannot ac-
count for the factors' effects on each other. Sliding 
Factors, for example, will be affected by Core Factors. In 
other words, support for intervention will be affected by 
the continuing conduct and outcomes of that intervention. 
Similarly, overwhelming interests, for example, may override 





strength. These are just two examples, but many more cases 
could be found where one factor affects another. But to 
consider these mutual effects would be unduly complicated 
and, in the case of Sliding Factors, unnecessary since the 
model's iterative nature dictates a constant reevaluation of 
these factors' effects. 
One irremediable limitation of the model, though, is 
that it cannot account for flawed analysis or invalid and 
unreliable information. A poor analysis that produces the 
wrong answer to either "Can we win" or "Should we win" can 
cost lives, prestige, and credibility as decision-makers 
seek support for flawed strategy. That the model cannot 
account for this is regrettabJ.e, but the process cannot be 
faulted if its inputs are poor. History has shown that 
smart people do in fact make wro~g decisions based upon poor 
information. But even as simple a model as this can provide 
a frame of reference for informed decisions, or for a post 
mortem in case of failure. 
This study is concerned with public opinion's role in 
the intervention decision. For this reason, it is now 
necessary to acknowledge the Core Factors' contributions and 
bid them farewell. The remaining chapters will be dedicated 
to examining more closely the effects of Sliding Factors. 
This closer examination will begin with two case studies. 
Thdse cases will be presented in sufficient detail so that 
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each factor's sources and effects on public attitudes can be 
ascertained. The cases also take place in about the same 
time frame, so that both are affected by the sarue polity and 
occur within similar international and domestic environ-
ments. 
In The first study - Nicaragua - public opinion moved 
steadily away from supporting direct military intervention, 
and the United states did not commit forces there. In the 
context of the model, intervention was rejected as a policy 
option in the consecutive process. 
In the case of Lebanon, U.S. forces were committed 
despite public concerns. But as the American involvement 
became more confused and costly, public opinion moved fur-
ther away from supporting intervention, and eventually 
overwhelmingly called for U.S. withdrawal. The consecutive 
process yielded an intervention decision, but support was 
irretrievably lost during the iterative process and policy-




A. CASE PARAMETERS 
On September 19th, 1983 Pre.sident Reagan signed a "find-
ing"* which authorized arming and supporting Nicaragua re-
sistance gro1Jps, with the stated objectiva of pressuring the 
Sandinistas into stopping their support for the leftist 
guerrillas in El Salvador. This finding, which asked Con-
gress for $45 million in aid for the Contras, was a continu-
ation of policy for the Reagan administration. The CIA had 
supported the Contras before, and had used its "ur.ilaterally 
controlled Latin assets" (UCLAs) to attack harbors and blow 
pipelines as recently as two weeks prior. 
This finding, though, began a series of events that led 
many people to believe the U.S. w~uld invade Nicaragua. 
These events culminated in November 1984 when Washington 
threatened a military response to an alleged shipment of 
MIG-21 jet aircraft from the Soviet Union. The MIGs did not 
materialize, and the immediate fear of military intervention 
abated. By the end of November, Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger laid out his well-known six condltions for U.S. 
*A Finding is a statement by the executive branch describing 
what it perceives as a problem, and outlining policy options 
to deal with the situation. 
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intervention (see Appendix C), and specifically stated that 
the Nicaraguan case had not met the criteria of these six 
tests. This case study will take the Secretary at his word 
and end with his speech. 
B. DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT 
Most Americans in 1984 did not know which side their 
government supported in Nicaragua. Alllericans were, however, 
quite willing to offer opinions on how the situation there 
was developing, and even on what policy options should be 
~xercised. This combination of ignorance and interest 
indicates that Central America was not high on the public's 
11
·corry" list, but it still was an emotionally charged and 
highly visible issue. 
Table 3.1 displays Alllerica's level of comparative igno-
rance regarding Central Alllerica in 1984. Recall from the 
introduction that American foreign policy awareness has 
generally increased since the years following Vietnam. 
Unfortunately, this increased awareness has not always 
preceded or even kept pace with foreign policy dilemmas. 
Such was the case with Nicaragua. The January and April 
polls indicate that one-fourth o· less of the American 
populace were aware their govern~~nt was supporting the 
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N . . t * icaraguan resis ance. By November of that year, much had 
happened to raise the level of awareness about conflict in 
the region, but it seems that most Americans assumed every-




Question: Do you happen to know which side the U.S. is 
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Source: Index Qf. Iryternational £!J.Qli~ Opinion 1984-1985 
This relative ignorance did not hinder many Americans 
Unless otherwise indicated, poll data are from the mass 
public. Data for the informed public, when available, 
include only those who were aware of the situation and knew 
who the U.S. was supporting in Central America. 
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from passing judgment on U.S. policy in Central America. 
Table 3.2 shows that, with a few exceptions, less than 30% 
of America approved of how its government was handling the 
situation in Central America. The two exceptions were 
December 1983, on the heels of the widely-accepte~ Grenada 
invasion, and December 1984, following the so-called MIG 
scare. But even in these brief spurts of approval, the 
support rate was barely over a third of the American popu-
lace. 
TABLE 3.2 
Question: Do you approve of Rwagan's handling of the 
















*Disapproval fell into 40-50% region, No Opinion ac-
counted for 20-30% of those questioned. 
source: ~ Gallup £Q.ll, 1984, 1985. 
It is in this milieu of ignorance and agitation that 
this st11dy be')ins. The American public is upset that policy 
is not working, but not upset enough to become informed 
about the region and ~he U.S. role there. The following 
sections will clarify that role up to and including the 
period under st·.'~-Y, and attempt an explanation of why public 
sentiment opposed U.S. intervention in Central America and, 





C. HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP47 
The United States and Nicaragua have had a long and 
colorful relationship. U.S. forces and filibustering merce-
naries invaded Nicaragua several times in the 19th century 
to protect trade and to insure claims on a proposed canal 
route. This latter objective cemented the United States to 
the Nicaraguan Conservative party that ruled until the 
Sandinista revolution in 1979. U.S. Marines landed in 
Nicaragua in 1909 to protect Conservative rebels, who were 
vying for control of the country. The Conservatives did 
gain control, but by 1912 the Marines were forced to return 
and protect their rule. The Marines were to stay almost 
continuously as virtual occupiers until 1933 when the Nica-
raguan National Guard, headed by Anastasio Samoza Garcia, 
was raised to enforce internal security. 
The major military effort against Conservative rule in 
the 1930s was posed by Augusto Sandino. His movement even-
tually resulted in offers of conciliation by the Conserva-
tive governruent. But this conciliation came to a violent 
end when Samoza had Sandino arrested and assassinated as he 
left a presidential dinner. Samoza seized power for himself 
in 1936 and began a family dynasty that was to rule Nicara-
gua for four decades. 
Franklin Roosevelt said of f.amoza "He may be an s.o.B., 
but he's our S.O.B."4 8 If he was "our S.O.B." then the 
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United States was surely Samoza's patron as well. He and 
his followers accepted American aid during their 40 year 
rule and in return supported virtually anything that Wash-
ington said or did. In the meantime, conservative Samoza 
regimes consolidated their wealth and power at the expense 
of their people. Living conditions for most Nicaraguans 
were abysmal, there was little or no pluralism, and the 
National Guard had a carte blanc to act in any way it saw 
fit. 
Opposition to Samoza and his National Guard came to a 
head in 1978. He had managed to alienate every constituency 
in Nicaragua to his rule - even the elitist - by systemati-
cally looting the economy. A loosely knit coalition finally 
succeeded in driving Samoza from his fortified bunker in 
Managua to a short retirement in exile.* The National 
Guard's dying acts included bombing the cities and destroy-
ing the country's fledgling industries49 • The human cost of 
the revolution was a~ many as 50,000 Nicaraguans killed and 
100,000 wounded, or 6% of the population50 . A comparable 
loss in the United States would be nearly 15 million people 
killed or wounded. The economic toll was also catastrophic. 
The revolution (or reaction to it) caused $480 million in 
direct economic damage, over $500 million disappeared in 
capital flight, and the Samozan government left behind a 
* Samoza was murdered in Paraguay in 1980. 
44 
$1.6 billion debt51. 
Following the ravolution, The Sandinista party consoli-
~ated power. They began widespread reforms to equalize land 
distribution and improve public services to the poor majori-
ty. Many of their methods, though, began to resemble those 
of newly formed communist governments. They called off 
promised elections and instituted press controls. These and 
other measures upset the United States. Many American 
leaders perceived a definite tilt to the left on the Sandin-
ista 's part, and felt that the party had duped their people 
and the international community. This feeling was exacer-
bated by the Sandinista's seeking aid from the Eastern bloc 
and instituting a military buildup. 
It is difficult to say whether the Sandinlstas looked to 
CUba and the Soviets for assistance because they feared 
Washington, or whether Washington turned against the Sandin-
istas because they feared a "little CUba" in Central Ameri-
ca. Whatever the cause, the result was a classic security 
dilemma where both sides took military and political stances 
that were avowedly deterrent, but could easily be construed 
as offensive52 • Nicaragua said it feared an American-led 
invasion, so it militarized the countryside and raised a 
military apparatus far larger than its neighbors possessed. 
The country also needed aid so it went to the Soviets and 
CUbans (as well as many Western nations), supposedly after 
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having been turned away by the United States. 
Washington, meanwhile, saw the Sandinista regime revok-
ing civil liberties, raising a large military, and cozying 
up to members of the Soviet bloc. The~e events resurrected 
the domino theory of the fifties and sixties and raised the 
specter of all Central America uacoming puppet communist 
states. This frightening impression was arguably amplified 
by the Reagan administration, which was elected on an anti-
Soviet, anti-communist platform. Nicaragua provided an 
enticing opportunity for this new conservative administra-
tion to demonstrate its anti-communist credentials and step 
up the East-West st~uggle. U.S. leaders pressured the 
Sandinista regime to reverse its slide to the left through 
economic, political, and military means. Econoruic aid was 
shut off. Managua was politically isjlated from its Central 
American neighbors. And the U.S. began supporting Nicara-
guan rebels, as well as arming and exercising with neighbor-
ing states, particularly Honduras and El Salvador.* 
Mutual animosity and distrust, then, provide the back-
drop for this !irst case. Neither Washington r1r Managua 
could be sure of the others• ultimate aim~. But both took 
hard line positions that inevitably reinforced the most dire 
expectations each had of the other. 
* Reagan first gave the CIA $19.8 million in 1981 to organize 
and train an army to fight the Sandinistas. This army 
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1 0. FEAR OF ESCALATION 
Nineteen eighty three and 1984 were t~nse years for 
American foreign policy.53 U.S./Soviet relations ~ere 
chilled by arms control fail·lres and the impending deplo~'-
ment of Pers~ing !Is in Euro~e. The Navy and Marines found 
themselves caught between bitterly opposed factions in 
Lebanon. And, of course, the United States was becoming 
more involved in Central American turmoil, most notably in 
Nicaragua and El Salvador. This tense climate was not 
~~mpletely lost on the American people. Many Americans 
feared that any spark of conflict could get out of control 
and the United Sta~es could find itself in a war it cid not 
want and for which it had not prepared. 
Support for U.S. military action in Nicaragua was tem-
pered by a fear that confl!ct could e~calate to a regional 
or even global level. There was also fear that armed con-
flict with Nicaragua, even if geographically limited, could 
drag on into a Vietnam-like scenario with too many Americans 
dying in an unwin.1able war for dubious political objectives. 
There were ma. · circumstances that conceivably linked 
U.S. intervention in Nicaragua with potential escalation, 
especially with the Soviets. Tensions between the United 
States and the Soviet Union were running relatively high 
over the period under consideration. The American people 
were forced to rethink their attitudes towards soviet lead-
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ership following the shooting down of Korean Airlines flight 
007 in August of 1983. The Soviets had also threatened to 
walk out of the I;1termediate Nuclear Force talks in October 
of that year (and later did abandon the negotiations). 
Fselings of appr~hension were certainly illustrated and 
perhaps exace:bated and symbolized by the movie The ~ 
After in November 1983, which depicted the grisly existence 
of post-WWII! America. 
There were far too many other sources of anxiety occur-
ring in the world to assert a causal relationship between 
the few events just described and a fear of global escala-
tion resulting from U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. But it 
is relevant to point out the linkages between that potential 
intervention and the possibility of conflict spreading to 
other parts of the globe. Many of these linkages were 
explicitly asserted by administration officials and support-
ers. Others may not have been cited at the time, but are 
valid in retrospect. 
The Soviets, for whatever reasons, were providing eco-
nomic and military assistance to the Nicaraguan regime. 
This placed Soviet interests at direct risk if the United 
States should attack Nicaragua. This point was brought home 
when it became public knowledge that a Soviet cargo ship had 
hit one of the mines CIA operatives had sown in Nicaraguan 
harbors54 . Ths risk to Soviet ships was made clear again 
when the Bakuriani was identified as a potential MIG trans-
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port and, eventually, was confirmed as a weapons carrier, 
even if no MIGs reached Nicaragua. There was a real poten-
tial, however remote, for the Soviets to become militarily 
involved in the region to protect their assets. The Kremlin 
seemed to foster this impression by maintaining a military 
presence in Nicaragua, and even participating in joint 
exercises with the C~bans off the U.S. southern coast55 ~ 
Add to this ~he Soviet defense minister's boasts of in-
creased missile submarines off the Am~rican coast, and there 
was bound to be some fear of Soviet reaction to a U.S. mili-
tary intervention in Nicaragua. 
Other states outside the region posed escalatory threats 
as well. Libya's Mohamar Quadaffi said he had sent troops 
to assist the Ni~aragua regime against potential U.S. ag-
gression56 . He certainly did not pose the same threat as 
the Soviets could in type or degree. But the worldwide 
spate of terrorist bombings over the period under scrutiny 
certainly reminded Americans of their relative vulnerability 
to attack by fanatical regimes and organizations. 
Regional escalation was also a very real possibility. 
There was certainly potential for a conflict to start in 
Nicaragua and spread throughout Central America. One com-
mentator even speculated the United States was poised for an 
invasion of Cuba, although there is no evidence that this 
was a widely held belief at the time 57 . But a conflict 
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spreading to Honduras and El Salvador .was certainly not out 
of the question, especially since these countries would 
probably serve as staging areas for U.S. forces and had 
ongoing internal rebellions of their own. 
Finally, there was the possibility that, even if con-
flict remained geographically limited, it could drag out 
over time and exact a rising physical, mental, and material 
toll. This is perhaps where the so-called Vietnam syndrome 
best applies. Many Americans looked at Nicaragua as another 
Vietnam for the United States. The terrain was at least 
superficially similar. Nicaragua was a small state standing 
up to the monolithic America~ And, perhaps most important, 
the goals of Nicaraguan intervention were poorly defined 
and/or poorly understood by most Americans. 
The Boland Amendment of 1982 forbade the United States 
from working to overthrow the Sandinistas. The administra-
tion repeQtedly denied this objective in its aid requests, 
insisting instead that U.S. policy was intended to bring the 
Sandinistas to the bargaining table, or to cut off the 
supply of arms to the rebels in El Salvador. But other 
public statements by Reagan and his representatives contra-
dieted those claims, instead insisting on "rolling back" 
communism, and asserting that these governments could not be 
trusted58 . Even in retrospect with all the information r.ow 
available, it is difficult to ascertain what the administra-






different individuals and offices routinely espoused contra-
dietary views. Certainly the view was no clearer to tha 
American people, who were forced to look through this fog to 
see where the policy was taking them. 
If the administration was unclear of its goals, the 
Sandinistas were sure to make the potential costs of inter-
vention clear. Twice during this period they mobilized the 
population for imminent invesion; first in June and then in 
November of 1984 59 . These and other measures were certainly 
intended to up the ante; to let U.S. leaders know that 
Nicaragua would not be anther Grenada; and U.S. soldiers 
would pay a high price if they crossed the border. 
doubtful this message was lost on the U.S. public. 
It is 
It was shown earlier that a significant majority of 
informed U.S. citizens were against intervention in Nicara-
gua. Poll data indicate that this aversion to intervention 
was due at least in part to a fear that such a conflict 
could get out of control. This fear was most often ex-
pressed in questions comparing Nicaragua to Vietnam. But 
there was an overall increased fear of ·war in general over-
laying the more obvious Vietnam comparison. Table 3.3 
summarizes poll results and shows a snapshot of U.S. fears 
and expectations regarding conflict in the period 1983-1984, 
as well as some earlier data for reference points. 
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TABLE 3.3 
Question: What is the most important problem facing 
this country today? 
Oct 1982 Oct 1983 Oct 1984 
Threat of war 6% 23% 30% 
Question: Will U.S. involvement [in Nicaragua or Cen-









Question: Have Reagan's policies brought the U.S. 
closer to war or closer to peace? 
Closer to war 









Source: Thg Gallup .f.Qll, 1983-1984. 
It is not clear why the "Closer to war" percentages 
changed so drastically from July to October of 1984. The 
lack of significant events in this period would indicate the 
differential may be due to effective electioneering by the 
Reagan campaign, although that is pure speculation. Even 
with this minor burp, though, the poll results indicate a 
growing concern about war in general and in particular an 
apprehension about U.S. chances of being caught in a Central 
American quagmire similar to Vietnam. Admittedly it re-
quires some interpolation and extrapolation to tie these 
particular questions to a fear of escalation. Unfortunate-
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ly, the author could find no pollsters who asked the all-
important (to this study) question, "Do you think U.S. 
intervention in Nicaragua could escalate into a broader 
regional or global war?" But the combination of tense 
international climate and public wariness of war in general 
would push the answer to that question (nad it been asked) 
towards the affirmative. Combine this fear of escalation 
with at best poorly understood goals, and the outcome was a 
move away from public support for intervention. 
E. GLOBAL/REGIONAL REACTION 
The external reaction to U.S. policy towards Nicaragua 
during the period under study was, in a word, negative. The 
international reaction to American "covert" actions left 
little doubt that anything resembling an invasion of Nicara-
gua would lead to widespread and vocal condemnation. 
Perhaps the incident that best illustrated this negative 
reaction to U.S. policy came in the wake of revelations 
about CIA operatives mining Nicaraguan harbors. U.S. allies 
condemned the action and even offered the Nicaraguans as-
sistance in clearing the mines. This was more than a subtle 
show of dissatisfaction. 
The entire European Community joined the anti-interven-




* with the Contadora group , ~~ey painted the un~ted States as 
the major culprit in the region and signed a protocol en-
dorsing the Contadora group's efforts. 60 
Another rebuke followed the Reagan administration'~ 
April decision to refuse the World Court's jurisdiction in 
cases involving Central America, and later attempts to have 
Nicaragua's case dismissed. 
The regional reaction to American policy was little 
better. Mexican President Miguel de la Madrid railed 
against U.S. policy before the House and Senate in May, 
accusing the administration of sabotaging peace efforts61 • 
His complaints appeared legitimate when the administration 
allegedly torpedoed the Contador~ treaty in October, after 
Managua had agreed to sign it62 . A new proposal, supposealy 
sponsored by the United States but presented by El Salvador, 
Costa Rica, and Honduras, failed to placate critics of U.S. 
policy and indeed only added to complaints of American 
me~dling. 
Much of the world, including u.s.•s allies, did not 
hesitate to express dissatisfaction with U.S. policy towards 
the region in general and Nicaragua in particular. A 1983 
resolution deploring intervention in Grenada passed the U.N. 
*The Contadora group, so named for the island where they 
first met, consists of Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, 
Costa Rica, and Guatamala. The group sought (an~ is seek-
ing) solutions to the many security probl~ms in Central 
America. 
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General Assemblv by a vote of 106-8, with 25 abstentions. 
The eight dissenters were the Organization of Eastern Carib-
bean States (OECS} members who had collaborated in the 
invasion, Israel, and the United States. A similar 1984 
resolution, passing 93-11 with 40 abstentions, urged "all 
states to refrain from intervening and suspend all supplies 
of arms" to El Salvador. France, Spain, and Australia were 
among the supporters of this latter resolution. 
World response to U.S. "covert" actions and overt policy 
statements were likewise overwhelmingly negative. Virtually 
every European ally, for example, took a stand against U.S. 
mining of Nicaraguan ports. Three (France, Belgium, Brit-
ain) even offered to supply minesweepers 63. Rejection of 
the mining was even stronger in most other regions of the 
globe. 
The CIA "assassination manual" also caused a torrent of 
negative reaction. One Austrian editorial called it "Gang-
sters (recommending] gangsters to hire more gangsters. 1164 
Even those who agreed that the Sandinistas posed a 
potential regional t11reat disagreed with the United states 
influencing Nicaragua's internal affairs. Reducing the 
Sandinista•s influence and telling them how to run their 
country, it seemed, were two different matters65 . This 
sentiment carried over to U.S. condemnation of the Nicara-
guan elections on November 4, 1984. Most observers saw the 
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elections as credible enough to recognize, an ... ~ certainly as 
fair as other regional attempts at pluralism. The French 
External Relations Minister praised the election before his 
National Assembly and expressed hope that they would "con-
tribute to detente in central America. 1166 And even if they 
were not fair, according to the Paris paper ~ Mende, "U.S. 
use of force in Nicaragua could ... be no more justifiable 
than the Soviets' use of force in Afghanistan (to fulfill 
its security requirements]. 1167 These citations carry a 
European slant to demonstrate that even among America's most 
important allies, support for its Nicaraguan policies was 
visibly lacking. 
In sum, it is clear that global reaction to U.S. Nicara-
guan policies was overwhelmingly negative. Americans were 
sensitive to this reaction, as evidenced by a May 1984 poll 
(TABLE 3.4), which posed the question: 
TABLE 3.4 
Question: By getting involved in Central America we 







Source: Index 2!. International pyblic Opinion 1983-1984 
Americans who were following the issue undoubtedly were 
sensitive to these charges of interference, and it is rea-




at all, it moved them away from supporting armed interven-
tion. 
F. VALUES 
American values played a key role in swaying public 
sentiment away from U.S. intervention in Ni~aragua. The 
period under scrutiny saw appeals to liberal idealism and 
assertions of pragmatic objectives. But these appeals to 
the liberal ethic were questionable even to many who shared 
the ultimate objective of a democratic Nicaragua, free from 
Soviet or CUban influence. The primary reason for this lack 
of U.S. policy support was an overall disenchantment with 
the means employed by the administration. Even many of 
those wh~ thought Reagan's goals were legitimate and worth 
seeking repudiated his methods, most notably the CIA's r~l.e 
in Nicaraguan internal affairs. Interested Americans c .. · tld 
see high potential costs for questionable goals, combiLed 
with the use of repugnant tactics and allies. 
The Reagan administration's attempts at appealing to 
values were made clear in statements, if not in deeds. The 
President himself aimed for the public's heartstrings with 
such phrases as "rolling back communism." He asserted the 
Nicaraguan people were "trapped in a totalitarian dungeon," 
lacking personal freedom and fearing repression68 • Shultz 
called the Sandj.nista attempt at l~gitimacy through elec-
tions a "sham" and stated "the tide of history is with 
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us.n 69 Unfortunately for the administration, the American 
people saw history more as a source of apprehension than 
hope where Nicaragua was concerned. A long history of 
regional intervention and the legacy of Vietnam combined to 
magnify potential costs of conflict, shrink the importance 
of any achievable goals, and cause revulsion at the means 
already being employed to achieve those goals. 
The administration did little to prepare the public for 
the potential costs of invading Nicaragua. This may be 
simply because the administration had neve: planned on such 
an invasion. But the possibility was there, as evidenced by 
comparisons between Nicaragua and Grenada (including the 
ominously named exercises Gren~dero I and II) and by reports 
of invasion contingency plans70 . The potential for direct 
military intervention certainly did exist, even though this 
was not the course of action finally taken. 
The Sandinistas, conversely, did prepare the American 
public for the costs of invasion. They were very clear in 
their intent to make U.S. intervention bloody and drawn out. 
Their own population was mobilized twice in 1984 to respond 
to a potential U.S. attack. Their army grew to be the 
region's largest. They were obviously prepared to make 
great sacrifices to increase the costs of a U.S.-led inva-
sion of their country. During the MIG scare of November 
1984, for example, they diverted 26,000 students from the 
coffee harvest to prepare defenses71 . This action had the 
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dual effect of increasing U.S. costs and in effect creating 
a martyr of the Nicaraguan economy by purposely abandoning 
the coffee crop to counter the "imminent" invasion. The 
latter effect, whether intentional or not, certainly did not 
increase public acceptance of administration policies. 
Potentially high costs have been acceptable to the 
American people to achieve legitimate and _worthwhile objec-
tives, in some cases. The administration's stated and 
inferred objectives were seen as neither legitimate or 
worthwhile, though, in the Nicaragua case. Stated objec-
tives included interdicting the arms flow to Salvadoran 
guerrillas and stopping communist expansion by reducing the 
threat Nicaragua posed to its neighbors. The implied 
(albeit illegal) objective was to force the Sandinista 
regime from power. None of these objectives were highly 
important to the American public, and certainly were not 
seen as worthy of the potential costs. Table 3.5 summarizes 
poll results regarding public perception of both the validi-
ty and importan~e of various U.S. policy objectives in 
Nicaragua. It is clear the public was not fearful that 
failing to meet these objectives would be particularly 
catastrophic to U.S. values, or even interests. 
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TABLE 3 .5 
January 1984 
Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the U.S. 









Source: ABC/Washington Post poll. Reported by State 
Dept. 
April 1984 
Question: Do you favor or oppose the overthrow of the 












Source: New York Times/CBS NewsPoll. Reported by State 
Dept. 
May 1984 
Question: Do you favor or oppose arms and support to 
contras who are "trying to overthrow the Sandinistas?" 
Favor Oppose No Opinion 
31% 60% 9% 
Question: Without 4000 troops and contra aid, the 
domino effect will occur in Central America? 
Agree 
39% 
Disagree Not sure 
53% 9% 
Source: Index .tQ International P1Jblic Qpinion 1983-1984 
September 1984 
Question: The United States' Central American policy as 
designed to prevent communism has been a failure or 
success? 
Failure Success Neither Not Sure 
52% 36% 2% 10% 
Source: Index .tQ International public Opinion 1984-1985 
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Finally, American values were often alienated by the 
means employed by the U.S. government and its agents against 
Nicaragua. The CIA' s mi ling operation met with considerable 
disapproval, even as William Casey asserted the &ction was 
minor compared to Soviet and Cuban expansionist influence in 
Nicaragua72 . Support for the contras was also questioned as 
reports of atrocities became public73 • It became difficult 
to justify calling these people freedom fighters or the 
moral equivalent of our founding fathers in the face of 
mounting evidence of their misdeeds against their country-
men74. The so-called CIA assassination manual, which became 
public in Oct~ber of 1984, was yet another affront to Ameri-
can values. Not many Americans wished to be closely associ-
ated with assassination, mob violence, and many of the other 
tactics this manual advocated. 
A climate of deception also seemed to persist that 
alienated many Americans. It was clear U.S. agents were 
fighting the Sandinistas, yet the administration insisted it 
was not trying to overthrow that regime. Congress was not 
kept fully informed of the mining, raising a furor in the 
Sendte when that operation became public. Even the rejec-
tion of World Court jurisdiction implied the United States 
had something to hide. Whether these and other actions were 
the result of deception or incoherent policy is iml:laterial. 
What was important was that the American public did not feel 
at all comfortable with what the administration was doing in 
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Nicaragua, largely because many of the administration's 
actions were apparent affronts to the American value system. 
Table 3.6 presents poll data that indicate to varying 
degrees what the U.S. public thought of various historical 
or potential actions by the U.S. towards Nicaragua and 
Central America in general. It is clear that in this case, 




Question: Do you favor or oppose of the United States 
helping opponents of the Nicaraguan government lay mines 










Source: CBS/New York Times NewsPoll. Reported by State 
Dept. 
May 1984 
Question: The U.S. must accept any allies in Central 







Question: Stop CIA activities that violate Nicaragua's 
rights, such as putting mines in Nicaraguan harbors? 
Favor 
56% 
Oppose No Opinion 
38% 6% 
Source: Index to International Public Opinion 1984-1985 
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July 1984 
Question: It is wrong for the CIA to finance the con-
tras? 
Agree Disagree Not sure 
55% 32% 13% 
source: Index to International Public Opinion 1984-1985 
It seems that values, then, played an intricate role in 
swaying American public opinion away from support for inter-
vention in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan government, aided by 
U.S. activists, painted a picture of high costs for U.S. 
involvement. Add to this impression a backdrop of illegiti-
mate or, at best, poorly defined perceived goals, sprinkled 
with the bright colors of clearly repugnant tactics, and the 
impact of values was a clear trend away from intervention 
support. 
G. CONCLUSION 
It is indicative of the importance most Americans placed 
on Central America in the early 1980s that the majority of 
people in the U.S. did not even know whom their gover~ment 
was supporting, much less what form this support took. But 
of those who were attentive to the subject, a clear and 
constant majority opposed U.S. intervention in the region. 
Table 3.7 illustrates this opposition, demonstrating that 
Americans• preferences tended towards the least intrusive 
methods for dealing with even the most serious incident 
during the period under study: the MIG scare. 
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TABLE 3.7 
Question: Which action would you support if the Rus-
sians send MIGs to Nicaragua?* 
Naval Blockade 
Increase contra assistance 












Source: Index to International Public Opinion 1984-1985 
*This study addresses direct sustained military inter-
vention. Of the policy options presented in this ques-
tion, only "Invasion" meets this criteria. 
This study has asserted three primary reasons for this 
opposition. First, the American people feared that the 
spark of a Nicaraguan intervention could set off an escala-
tion that might get out of control and, eventually, drag the 
United States into a broader or longer war than it was 
prepared to fight. This was probably the least influential 
of the three factors discussed, but it was nevertheless 
apparent. 
The second factor that tempered public opinion on inter-
vention was a lack of global and regional support for ~hat 
course of action. Traditional adversaries and allies alike 
expressed displeasure at the U.S. role in Nicaragua and 
clearly expressed their opposition to an American-led inter-
vention. 
Finally, America's values were alienated by U.S. actions 
in Nicaragua, and by the potential for direct intervention. 
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War was simply not seen as a worthwhile course given the 
potential costs and objectives. This seemed to be the 
strongest factor in pulling and maintaining public support 
away from the intervention decision. 
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IV. LEBANON 
A. CASE PARAMETERS 
In August 1982, the U.S. Marines were called upon to 
oversee the evacua~ion of Palestinian Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO) guerrillas from Beirut, Lebanon. The Israelis 
had invaded that country and threatened to root out the PLO 
fighters in what would inevitably be a bloody battle on the 
streets of Beirut. U.S., French, Italian, and, E::ventualJy, 
British forces were dispatched under an agreement that 
called for the PLO to leave in return for Isruel not enter-
ing the Muslim enclave of West Beirut. This case begins 
with the Marines' arrival on 28 August 1982. 
The Marines' stay in Lebanon, excepting a brief hiatus 
in September 1982, was to last about 18 months. During that 
time, naval and Marine units would engage various Lebanese 
factions and the Syrian army in often intense figtting. 
Over 260 Marines and sailors would die (241 in a single 
incident) during this intervention, along with many of their 
French and Italian par~ners in the multi-national force 
(MNF). Unfortunately, the peace was not kept and in the end 
the MNF pulled out of Beirut having achieved few if any of 
its original objectives. 
President Reagan announced on 7 February 1984 that the 
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Marines would leave Beirut and "redeploy" to ships offshore. 
Although limited actions - most notably naval gunfire -
continued after this redeployment, for this study's purposes 
the U.S. military intervention ended with that move, which 
was completed on 26 February 1984. 
B. DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT 
As in Nicaragua, fewer than fifty percent of the Arneri-
can public could identify which side the U.S. government 
supported in Lebanon. The fact that U.S. Marines and naval 
units had intervened, though, inevitably resulted in a 
rising level of interest in events there. Table 4.1 indi-
cates that forty to fifty percent of Americans demonstrated 
at least a limited knowledge and/or interest in th~ players 
and objectives surrounding the U.S. intervention. This 
number shot up sharply in the fall and winter of 1983, 
probably due to increased U.S. combat activity and losses. 
TABLE 4.1 








Source: Index to International Public Opinion 1983-1984 








Source: ABC/Washington Post reported by State Dept. 
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The American public was slightly disinclined to involve 
its armed forces in the Lebanon quagmire following the 
Israeli invasion in June 1982. The disinclination became 
more pronounced following Reagan's intervention decision 
and, as might be expected, climaxed just prior to and fol-
lowing the announced withdrawal of U.S. troops in February 
1984. Table 4.2 summarizes this trend. It is interesting 
to note that following the Marine barracks bombing on 23 
October 1983 there was a brief rally in support for inter-
vention, but it was short-lived. 
TABLE 4.2 
Question: Should th~ U.S. send a small number of peace-








Source: Index to International Public Opinion 1982-1983 
Question: Do you think the U.S. made a mistake sending 
troops to Lebanon? 
Yes No No Opinion 
Early October 1983 51% 37% 12% 
Late October 1983 45 45 10 
December 1983 47 44 9 
January 1984 52 39 9 
iHd February 1984 58 33 9 
source: ~ Gallup E2.l.l, 1983 and 1984 
Significantly, at least one poll indicated that the 
attentive and mass publics were of the same mind on this 
issue, showing virtually identical levels of support for 
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U.S. troop involvement among both groups. 75 Americans 
tended to be more split on President Reagan's role in the 
Lebanon intervention, with roughly a thil'd showing support 
for his overall policies (Table 4.3). This seems to indi-
cate that the idea of intervention in a peacekeeping role 
was not so obnoxious to Americans as the way in which the 
role was carried out. 
TABLE 4.3 
Question: How do you rate Reagan's handling of the 
situation in Lebanon? 
Approve Disapprove No Opinion 
July 1982 29% 59% 12% 
Early October 1983 32 61 7 
Late October 1983 39 58 2 
January 1984 28 N.A. N.A. 
Mid February 1984 28 60 12 
N.A. - Not Available 
Sources: Index to International Public Opinion, 1982-
1983 and 1983-1984, The Gallup Poll, 1983 and 1984 
In the end, it seemed that Americans perceived the 
Lebanon intervention as an admirabl~ but overly-ambitious 
cause. The public saw the Administration's effort as well-
intentioned but doomed t~ failure by circumstances beyond 
its contro176 . This was the public's attitude and, eventu-
ally, the Administration echoed these feelings by pulling 
the Marines out of harm's way. 
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C. HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP77 
Two themes permeate Lebanon's history. First, it is and 
always has been a nation divided by sectarian strife. Its 
peoples' allegiances have virtually always subordinated 
national interest to sectarian interest. Alliances have 
been made for convenience, but antipathies have been ever-
lasting. 
The secvnd major theme in Lebanon has been a tug of war 
between the nations' Arabic roots and its quest for accept-
ance among the major world powers, especially in the West. 
Lebanon has maintained a patron power relationship since its 
incorporation into the Ottoman Empire in the sixteenth 
century. But it has also relied heavily on its Arab neigh-
bors for trade and cultural roots. This pull between East 
and West has exacerbated the effects of sectarian splits, 
much like r,onstant pressure on a fabric can turn a minor 
tear into a major run. 
Prior to 1920, the two major ~ebanese sects were the 
Maronite Catholics and Druze Muslims. These sects, and a 
myriad of lesser minorities, are thought to have settled the 
Mount Lebanon region between the fifth and eleventh cen-
turies AD. The sects were fairly autonomous and prospered 
when the ottomans incorporated them in the sixteenth cen-
tury. The Turks maintained the feudal or sectarian system 
of Mount Lebanon, allowing each community its own rulers, 





Sectarian violence resulted in the massacre of thousnnds 
of Christians in 1860. This prompted the major Christian 
powers to action in Lebanon. France, Britain, Prussia, 
Austria, and Russia, as part of the so-called treaties of 
capitulation with the Ottomans, forced the Turks to take 
more responsibility for Lebanese affairs and granted special 
status for the Lebanese nati~n. This continued until 1914, 
when the Ottoman Empire revoked the treaties with its entry 
into WWI wit~ the Axis powers. Durir,g that war, 100, 000 of 
the 450,000 Lebanese died of starvation or disease78 . 
In 1920, as a result of the Axis' loss in WWI, the 
French were given a mandate in Lebanon by the League of 
Nations. Paris promptly created Grand Lebon, or Greater 
Lebanon from Mount Lebanon and parts of Syria. This action 
brought the third major tile into the Lebanese mosaic - the 
Shi-ite Muslims. 
The French mandate in Lebanon ended in 1943 when a 
National Pact was drawn up by Lebanese nationals. This 
National Pact called on the various sects to recognize and 
respect each other, and also allotted parliament seats and 
minister posts among the various communities. The French 
were powerless to stop this action, although a brief attempt 
to reassert control after WWII was thwarted by the British. 
Britain thus became the new Western influence on Lebanon, at 
least until the United States entered the scene following 
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the Suez crisis of 1956. 
The U.S. involvement in Lebanon became significant in 
1958 with the Revolt of the Pashas. 79 A civil war, fanned 
by Nasser's Arab nationalism and the ruling Maronites' 
intransigence to change, had developed in Lebanon. This was 
not of great concern to the United States, though, until 
King Faisal was overthrown and killed in Iraq, upsetting the 
regional anti-Soviet balance of power. Washington feared 
the new Iraqi r~gime would attempt to ~xtcnd its influence 
into Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. Lebanon's Maronite leader, 
meanwhile, requested U.S. a~sistance in putting down his 
enemies. Fifteen thousand Marines landed in 1958 a.-i pro-
vided a stabilizing influence that allowed diplomacy to 
eventually sort things out. The Marines were tightly reined 
by the Lebanese Army and the U.S. State Department, so that 
th~lr presence w~s more a force in being rather than active-
ly combatant. They left in October 1958, suffering just one 
combat death.so A July 1958 poll, incidentally, found more 
approval than disapproval among Americans for the U.S. role 
during the civil wars1. 
Things settled down in Lebanon for a few years following 
the 1958 civil war. But the 1960s and early 1970s saw 
innumerable sticks being added to the fire that would keep 
this ~~mpest pot boiling and, eventually, lead to a second 
civil war in 1975. 
Although Lebanon itself was not involved in The Arab-
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Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, those conflicts deepened the 
cleavages between Christian and Muslim factions. The wars 
also exacerbated the Palestinian refugee problem, which 
eventually led to yet another sect in Lebanon's societal 
mosaic. 
Economic problems also contributed to Lebanon's strife, 
especially in the 1970s. Inflation rose as economic output 
decreased. This deepened the split between the haves (pre-
dominately Maronite) and the more numerous poor Muslim 
sects. 82 The Sunnis and Shi-ites called for a bigger piece 
of the economic pie, as well as greater political participa-
tion for their growing majority. The Maronites, on the 
other hand, were most interested in maintaining their fa-
vored positions, but also feared for their physical and 
societal survival. 
Fighting between factions and factions within factions 
began in earnest in 1975. Syrian and Israeli interventions 
often changed the character but not the content of conflict 
during the civil war. Eventually, other Arab states were 
able to broker a cease-fire in October. of 1976. Very little 
was decided by the war, even though 25,000-40,000 people 
loAt their lives and as many as half a million were left 
homeless83 . A temporary agreement was made, but fighting 
began again almost immediately. Matters would come to a 








On March 11 1978, eight Lebanon-based Palestinian ;uer-
rillas hijacked a bus in Israel. rhirty-one Israelis and 
six of the guerrillas died jn the ensuing gun battle. 84 
Three days later, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) invaded 
southern Lebanon. As was the custom, Lebanon as a whole 
suffered for the actions of a few. The invasion resulted in 
some 2000 deaths and 265,000 additional refugees 85. By 
March 19 the United Nations Security Council accepted u.s.-
sponsored resolution 425, which called upon Israel to with-
draw from Lebanon and created a 6000 man peace-keeping 
force. Israel largely complied with the order over a two 
month period, leaving all of Lebanon except a narrow border 
strip. 
Factional f ightinq continued in Lebanon over the next 
few years until the next major conflict occurred. Syria, in 
April 1981, placed a Soviet-made SA-6 surface-to-air missile 
system in the Bekaa valley after losing several h~licopters 
to the Israelis. Israel was preparing to destroy these 
batteries when the United States undertook to intervene with 
diplomacy and head off a potentially serious regional con-
frontation. Philip Habib engaged in some shuttle diplomacy 
that succeeded in preventing an Israeli attack but failed to 
remove the missiles. Meanwhile, the factions :~!thin Lebanon 
continued to jockey for power, carry out reprisals and 
counter-reprisals, and seek new alliances. such was the 
Lebanese tradition. 
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The role of Bashir Gemayal deserves further amplifica-
tion at this point because of his role in later evenLs that 
are important to this study. Gemayal represented a radical 
Maronite fringe that increasingly eschewed compromise and 
sought ultimate control over Lebanon. He consolidated 
(often by forre) Christian factions and turned his aims 
against the state's Muslim majority, aa well as the Pales-
tinians and Syrians. In doing this, he needed and gaine1 
Israel as an ally. He dld this through commonality of 
interest to be sure, but also through deception and ruth-
lessness, neither of which, incidentally, were at all pecul-
iar to him or his faction. Thus when the threat of another 
Israeli invasion loomed in 1981 and 1982, mo5t Christians, 
and Ge:mayal in particular, welcomed it as an opportu1dty to 
expand their own influence and rid theDselves of other 
competing sects. 
That opportunity did come in the summer of 1982. Ten-
sions were high between Israel and Syria. The PLO had 
established a virtual state witrin a state in southern 
Lebanon, from which they carried out frequent if not partic-
ularly damaging attacks against Israel. The spark that lit 
the tinderbox occurred in June 1982 when the Israeli ambas-
sador in London was assassinated by a Palestinian gunman. 
The IDF invaded and, for whatever reasons, marched north for 
Beirut. 8 6 
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The Israeli invasion set off an immediate reaction in 
Washington and other capitals, causing a flurry of diplomat-
ic activity to end the crisis. Finally, in August 1982 a 
cease-fire was negotiated that would allow the Palestinian 
fighters to evacuate Beirut under cover of the multi-nation-
al force, comprised of French, Italian, and (at PLO leader 
Yasser Arafat's insistence) U.S. forces. This compromise 
was reach~d largely to spare a besieged Beirut a devastating 
house-to-house battle between PLO and Israeli forces. The 
agreement also spelled out guarantees for the safety of 
Palestinian civilians left behind in Beirut87 . 
The Marines landed in Beirut harbor on 25 August 1982 
with the mission of keeping the peace for, at most, 30 days. 
This limited commitment would end 18 months late~, at great 
cost and with little gain. The United states and its peace-
keeping partners had become the latest victims of Lebanon's 
social and political morass. That country's sectarian 
animosities had a rich history and would not be set aside 
simply because outside powers wished it so. The great 
cultural pull between those who admired and wished to court 
the developed world and those with a more traditional Arab 
bent had already stretched Lebanese society to the breaking 
point. The introduction of outside forces only changed the 
calculus of conflict. It did not change the underlying 
causes. 




Marines' stay in Beirut. The following sections will high-
light factors that influenced the American public's negative 
reaction to their ordeal. 
D. FEAR OF ESCALATION 
This case is set in generally the same time period as 
the previous Nicaraguan study. Ther~ is, in fact, a five 
month overlap in the fall and winter of 1983-1984. The 
previous case described a generally tense international 
climate, beta in general East-West relations and in bilater-
al or regional U.S. concerns. The East-West tensions and 
resultant public concerns were previously addressed so 
require little elaboration here. The primary focus will be 
on escalatory fears based upon regional circumstances, most 
notably the Soviet-Syrian r~lationship and the ever-present 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The American public, it will be 
shown, did perceive and fear a potential for escalation 
resulting from U.S. intervention in Lebanon. 
u.s.-soviet relations were quite strained during the 
period under study. This backdrop of hostility arguably 
amplified feelings of uneasiness or uncertainty where u.s.-
Soviet conflict was possible. It did not take too wild an 
imagination to see this possibility in Lebanon. Lebanon is 
near the Soviet periphery. But more importantly, Syria was 
a major player in the Lebanese intervention and was quite 
close to Moscow. Many Americans could envisage a scenario 
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where U.S. forces became locked in a full fledged war with 
Syria, eventually involving Soviet advisors and even troops. 
That Soviet arms would be involved was a given. The Syrians 
had vast quantities of the latest Soviet equipment. And 
Moscow was quick to resupply the Syrian anny following its 
initial Josses to the Israeli Self Defense Forces88 . 
The Administration seemed to actually fan the fear of 
escalation through announcements and threats regarding the 
Syrian and Soviet role in Lebanon. Secretary of State 
Shultz, following his peace-seeking tour in May 1983, 
alleged that Soviet pressure was hampering a Syrian pull~ut 
from Lebanon89 . Two days later Secretary of Defense 
Weinberger stated the U.S. would "retaliate strongly" if 
Syrian or Syrian-based Soviet troops were used in Lebanon or 
against the Israelis, although the Administra~ion acted 
quickly to sof~en that threat90 . After the Marine bar-
racks was bombed, Weinberger again attacked Syria, claiming 
he was "sure" Damascus was behind the bombing91 . His 
conviction was perhaps backed up by the 4 December U.S. 
bombing raid on Syrian positions. Again, though, by mid 
January the Defense Department eased off on its blame of 
Syria for the bombings and shifted the blame towards 
Iran92 . 
The American public recognized this potential for esca-
lation to war with Syria and even the Soviet Union. The 
public also had definite opinions on whether this escalation 
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should be allowed to occur, as indicated in Table 4.4. 
Table 4.4 
Question: U.S. involvement in Lebanon could escalate 













Question: Do you favor/oppose joining with the Israelis 
to drive Syria out of Lebanon, even if it risks getting 












Source: Index to International Public Opinion 1983-1984 
The marked drop in fear of greater Syrian or Soviet 
involvement in 1984 probably resulted from widespread 
speculation that President Reagan was looking for a graceful 
exit from Lebanon. The opposition to escalation, however, 
increased during this period, probably reflecting the widely 
held belief (to be discussed later) that the Administra-
tion's goals were not achievable at virtually any cost. 
Syria and the Soviet Union did not provide the only 
potential for escalation in Lebanon. The intervention took 
place within the wider arena of the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
which had produced three major wars and numerous skirmishes 
over the past four decades. There was certainly a potential 
for Lebanon to provide the spark for a regional conflagra-
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tion that could indeed have started WWII!. 
There was also the threat of terrorism to consider. 
U.S. involvement in Lebanon angered many fanatical (by 
Western standards) regimes and organizations. This point 
was· brought home not just by the barracks and embassy bomb-
ings in Beirut, but also by the bombing of the U.S. embassy 
in Kuwait following stepped up U.S. attacks on Syrian and 
Druze positions in December 1983. Americans knew all too 
well this relative vulnerability to terrorist tactics and 
certainly considered it an escalatory threat. 
The temporal realm provided still another potential for 
escalation. Americans feared an open-ended commitment of 
U.S. troops, largely because of the many unknowns involved 
in the conflict. Reagan first was prepared to maintain a 
presence for "a limited period of time" to get the Lebanese 
government "back on its feet. 1193 Congress enthusiastical-
ly approved of these limited means and objectives in the 
beginning, but questions were inevitably asked about what 
"limited" meant, and whether the Lebanese government had any 
feet on which to stand, even with American help. Congress 
was seeking a more active role in the intervention by August 
1983, and in September began debating the U.S. role under 
the War Powers Ac~. Reagan was ready to cede some Congres-
sional role by then, conceding "I don't think we were pre-
pared for, or believed there would be an outright civil 
war." 94 By October 1983 Congr~ss and the President ham-
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mered out a war powers compromise that set an 18 month limit 
on U.S. military involve~~nt in Lebanon. It is difficult to 
ascertain how credible the U.S. public perceived this limit 
to be, but it is clear by Table 4.5 that they were nearly 
evenly split on whether or not it was the proper amount of 
time. 
Table 4.5 




Not long enough 
No opinion 
Source: The Gallup Poll 1983 










These polls indicate that half of all Americans were wrong 
about how long it would take for U.S. intervention in Leba-
non to achieve its goals. It is highly probable that very 
few people knew what U.S. intervention goals should have 
been, whether these goals could have been achieved, and how 
they should have been pursued. And indeed, this assertion 
seems to have been borne out when the President himself 
admitted the Marines' role in Lebanese politics was untena-
ble, and much of the American public came to see interven-
tion as a well~intentioned mistake. 
A cloud of uncertainty permeated the American nnder-





particular; an uncertain environment, uncertain goals, and 
uncertain commitments. All of these uncertainties invoked 
the classic analogy of Vietnam. And, as in Nicaragua, 
Americans accepted this analogy on a large scale. This 
analogy undoubtedly influenced their support for interven-
tion. A Gallup poll in early October 1983 asked specifical-
ly whether U.S. involvement in Lebanon "will" (not "could"} 
turn into another Vietnam. Sixty-four percent said yes, 
with 28% rejecting the analogy. 95 The comparison points 
to a fear of unknown (but probably substantial} commitment 
for dubious and/or poorly understood objectives, with the 
added possibility of superpower escalation. It is quite 
reasonable to argue under these circumstances that fear of 
escalation moved the American public away from supporting 
the Lebanese intervention policy. 
E. GLOBAL/REGIONAL REACTION 
AI.aerica's intervention in Lebanon received mixed reviews 
throughout the Middle East and the globe. Nearly all of 
hmerica's allies, along with many non-aligned states, sup-
ported the broad goals of intervention, i.e. a stable cen-
tral yovernment and the ultimate withdrawal of all foreign 
forces. Most states also agreed that a temporary MNF was a 
reasonable means to these ends. But support began to wane 
in the fall of 1983 when the U.S. stepped up its combat 
role. Many nations (allies included} saw the American role 
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changing from that of allowing an environment for reconcili-
ation to forcing a solution on the non-Christian factions. 
In effect, the United States was taking sides. This was 
where many supporters got off the train and lessened or even 
withdrew their support for U.S. intervention. 
1. Regional Reaction 
Arab reaction to U.S. involvement in Lebanon was 
largely negative, although to varying degrees. Hard line 
anti-Western states like Syria, Iraq, and Ljbya were pre-
dictably and vehemently opposed to the U.S. role in the 
region, viewing it as imperialist, colonial, and unwarranted 
meddling. It can be assumed that these states' opinions 
were largely discounted by the U.S. public due to their long 
tradition of anti-U.S. dogma on vi.rtually any matter of 
foreign policy. The more important reactions emanated from 
capituls of so-called moderate Arab states, including Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and th9 Gulf States. These attitudes 
were certainly less vindictive toward the American role, but 
still they were hardly supportive. The May 1983 peace 
accord brokered by the United States particularly rankled 
the Arabs because of its recognition of Israel by Lebanon 
and legitimization of the Maronite regime. These Arab 
states also oppose~ the U.S. military strikes in November 
1983 through February 1984 because these strikes surpassed 
"the essence of the American role in Lebanon and (were] an 
infringement of Washington's attitude and obligations toward 
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the peace operation and of what is expected of it as a 
superpower." 96 The United S~ates, it seemed, had over-
stepped its bounds. 
overall Arab attitudes on the U.S. intervention can 
be amply illustrated by their reactions to the U.S. Embassy 
and Marine barracks bombings in April and October 1983 
respectively. Many Arab ~tates blamed Israel for the bomb-
ing, citing benefits the Jewish state could derive from 
continuing chaos and MNF withdrawa1 97 • Others, spanning 
the political spectrum from Syria to Saudi Arabia, saw the 
bombings as the inevitable consequence of flawed Western 
policy. This latter stance was adopted by the Arab League 
as we11 98 . 
Israel exhibited an interesting reaction to the U.S. 
intervention. The Israelis supported the MNF goal of a 
stable Lebanon with Gemayal as its lead~r. But their idea 
of how this should be done evolved from supporting the very 
behavior the MNF was meant to deter, to virtual abandonment 
of its Lebanese conquests and objectives. 
Antipathy between the United States and Israel over 
the latter's invasion of Lebanon ran high in the summer and 
fall of 1982. Washington called for an Israeli withdrawal 
early on, and the MNF was originally meant to facilitate 
this withdrawal by guaranteeing the removal of Israel's 
primary target - the PLO - from Lebanon. The PLO was eva~u-
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ated in August 1982, followed almost immediately by the MNF. 
But then Israel moved into West Beirut contrary to the 
cease-fire agreement and allowed t~e Christian militia to 
ravage the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila, 
killing hundreds or even thousands of non-combatants. 99 
The Multi-National Force nations agreed to return to Beirut 
almost immediately. 
Israel continued its support for Christian factions 
and maintained control over the strategic Shouf mountains 
overlooking Beirut as the MNF was reestablishing itself in 
Beirut prop~r. Confrontation betwe'en MNF and IDF forces was 
all too common, though. In one celebrated incident, a 
Marine Captain stopped three Israeli tanks from crossing his 
checkpoint by drawing his pistol and threatening to shoot 
them100 . This was but one case of alleged "taunting" of 
Marines by IDF units 10 ~. The primary tension was caused by 
the U.S. insistence that Israel withdraw and let the MNF 
restore order. This demand was backed in April by Washing-
ton• s refusal to deliver F-16 aircraft Israel had ordered 
until that country left Lebanon. 
The situation had rever~ed, though, by the fall of 
1983. The Israelis wanted out, even without security guar-
antees or Syrian withdrawal. But now, Washington recognized 
that an Israeli withdrawal would create a power vacuum. The 
Israelis did pull out of the Shouf mountains unilaterally in 
September 1983, creating the worst-case scenario of all out 
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factional war for this strategic location. This action drew 
the United States' forces deeper into the fray and increased 
tensions !urther between Washington and Jerusale~. 
2. Global Reaction 
Ame~ica's European allies were more supportive of 
intervention, but in the end they too saw it as a futile 
albeit necessury effort; necessary to prevent a total con-
flagration, but futile in that the objectiv~s of a stable 
government and removal of foreign forces could not be 
achieved. Europeans in general disapproved of America's 
stepped-up combat efforts in the fall of 1983, although few 
useful alternatives were offered. This feeling of good 
intentions but lost goals was pervasive both in America's 
MNF ~artners and other European capitals. Fifty percent of 
the French, for example, approved of the MNF in October of 
1983, but barely a third approved of U.S. strikes in Leba-
non102. 
Italy. 
Similar feelings could be found in Britain and 
As was stated earlier, the rest of Europe supported 
the goals of intervention, especially at the beginning. But 
the means became less popular as co~bat escalated in the 
fall of 1983. The~e was universal support for the cease-
fire in September that temporarily halted fighting following 
the IcraP.li withdrawal. And the Europeans were appalled at 
the barracks bombings of October 23. But the picture paint-
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ed in the European press after that was one of an America 
stuck in a just but hopeless cause. Editorials in Belgium, 
Sweden, and elsewhere acceded the requirement for peacekeep-
ers for regional stability, but acknowledged that those 
forces could do little to solve Lebanon's problems. The 
Swedish paper Svenska Dagbladet captured this sentiment in 
an article titled "Innocent Optimism Wiped out:" 
Many good intentions have been buried in the Middle 
East. The [MNF] in Beirut ... has been transformed into 
one military factor among many in the complicated Leba-
nese ga'ed a hostage to the superior power of circum-
stances. 3 
This ambivalent feeling was given concrete form in September 
and December 1983 when as many as 15 Western nations refused 
to participate in the peacekeeping mission104 . The possi-
bility of a U.N. peacekeeping force was brought up, but 
quickly died under a veto threat from the Soviet Union. 
Among the European allies, it seemed, condolences were 
abundant, criticisms frequent, and alternative solutions 
few. 
Asian reaction was similarly ambivalent. North 
Korean and Vietnamese tirades were predictable and probably 
had little influence on the American public. The Japanese 
were typically lacking a consensus on the role of peacekeep-
ing forces, first pledging aid for the MNF, and then opting 
out after it became apparent the forces would actually by 
used in combat105 . 
The South Xorean government supported the U.S. role 
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in Lebanon, placing it in the broader East-West conflict, 
especially following the KAL-007 shooting. 106 Neither 
Japan nor Korea, though, had a large stake in Lebanese 
events so theirs' and most of their neigh~ors' ~eactions 
were relatively moot on the matter of U.S. intervention. 
The 0·1erall reaction to U.S. involvement seemed to 
precede what Americans eventually felt about U.S. interven-
tion in Lebanon. It was a geed cause, but nothing co~ld 
really have been done. The regional Arab and Israeli reac· 
tions to U.S. involvement were largely negative, and Ameri-
ca 1 s important allies saw some inte~~ntion necessary if 
futile. These mixed reviews probably served to further 
co~plicate the contradictory cues Americans receiy~d from 
abroad about their government's actions. This confusion was 
readily apparent in a February poll in which American were 
Pvenly split on the question of whether removing the Marin~s 
would be setback for U.S. foreign policy107~ 
When all things are considered, it would be difficult 
to argue that the global/regional reaction to U.S. interven-
tion swayed public opinion either toward or away from sup-
port for that intervention. International reac~ion probably 
did, however, contribute to the ultimate feeling of hope-
lessness Americans felt about Lebanon, even if this help-
lessness did not translate directly into dissension over the 




The initial August 1982 U.S. interveutio~ in Lebanon 
could have served as a model for putting American values 
into practice. The goals were quite in line with the liber-
al ethic, including stopping an already deadly conflict, 
ridding a sovereign state of outside (Syrian, Israeli, PLO} 
influence, and strengthening the central government. There 
was even the benefit of having been asked in by the host 
governmsnt's leader, in this case Bashir Gemayal. Costs 
would be virtually non-existent in the Marines' ''carefully 
limited, noncombatant role." 108 But the satin finish soon 
began to fade on this picture as Americans began to feel 
t.hat even these limited objectives were out of reach, and 
that eventual costs would outstrip the objectives, even if 
they were attainable. 
The initial Marine intervention in Lebanon was solely to 
evacuate the PLO fighters from Beirut. In this they were 
successful, and the Marines left shortly thereafter. But 
the massacres at the Shatila and Sabra camps horribly illus-
trated the central governnent's weakness and renewed calls 
for the MNF to return and prevent a recurrenc~~ President 
Reagan, with widespread Congressional and public approval, 
agreed to send the Marines back into Beirut for a limited 
period to get the Lebanese government "back on its feet." 
And in fact, even in the fall of 1983 when the Marines had 
been in Beirut for a year with little to show for it, a 
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majority of the American public supported the assertion that 
Lebanon needed U.S. help to reestdblish control of its 
country, both from enemies within and without109 . 
iLonic in retrospect that the viability of any ~.s. rola in 
these objectives did not come under serious doubt in the 
Administration, especially when Reagan himself rLcognized in 
Septenber 1982: 
Israel must have leerned that there is no way it can 
i~pose its own solutions on hatreds as deep and bitter 
as those that produced [Sabra, Shatila massacres). If 
it seeks to do so, it will only rink more deeply into 
the quagmire that looms before it. O 
The Administration continued to couch its objectives in 
the liberal ethic, even after the original goals had lost 
their luster. Following the 23 October 1983 Marine barracks 
bornbi~g, Reagan cited vital U.S. national interests in 
Lebanon, and asserted 11 ••• our actions are in i:.he cause of 
world peace. 11111 Later, in December, the President defend-
ed increased U.S. combat action by stating "W~akness on the 
part 0£ those who cherish freedom inevitably brings on a 
threat to that freedon. 11112 But the American p~blic was 
losing confidence in the "rightness" of its government's 
actions, or 3t least in its ability to achieve its objec-
tives. A February 1984 poll indicated t~at less than a 
third of Americans thought U.S. policy was successful in any 
of the original intervention obj~ctives 113 . It is clear 
tnat, while the origi~al objectives of U.S. intervention 
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were perfectly acceptable to A~crican value~, ov0r ti~0 the 
public began to sec these objectives as unattainable, exc~pt 
possibly at a large and unacccpt~ble cost. 
As the Mari~es' tenure in Lebanon continued, what had at 
first been only potential costs bcca:::e quite tangible to th1~ 
Ar.iCrican public. The first U.S. COilibat d~aths in A~gust 
1983 forced hr.erica to put a price tag on its intervention 
objectiv'es. As it turned out, the "price" the public was 
willing to pay did not match what would be needed to meet 
even the limited objectives set forth by the Administration. 
Something had to give. Polls ta~en in the fall and winter 
of 1983-1984 indicated that Americans did not see war or 
even the risk of more deaths as worthwhile in Lebanon, given 
what could be attained there. In a word, it seemed T.hat 
Arilericar.s were tired of Lebanor1. Th<:!y were tired of bleed-
ing. T~ey were tired of pursuing objectives that were 
probably not attainable, and whose value had ebbed over 
time. Achieving the objective of ridding Lebanon of foreign 
forces, especially Syrians, was no closer in January 1984 
than it had been in August 1982. The "host" government that 
had requ0sted assistance had turn~d out to be just another 
fighting faction with a thin veneer of legitimacy. And the 
idea that the U.S. could stop sectarian strife in Lebanon 
simply lacked legitimacy given events of the past year. 
This combination o-_· increased costs and rapidly deteriorat-
ing objectives could hardly be expected to support the 
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weight of A~crican ideals and the liberal ethic. u .s. 
Mnrincs, nest A~crican3 agreed, had been pl~ced in "shameful 
and wrong" dcfen3elcss positions 114 , and for what? To 
fig!1~ an unwinnablc war whose outcome, even if successful, 
would provide ctubicus gains for the United States, propagate 
repugnant conditic~s within the host country, and involve 
unwarranted costs in blood and treasure for the Anerican 
people. Once again, the Vietnam analogy cannot be avoided, 
although it requires littl~ elaboration by now. The Vietnam 
syndrome, for better or worse, was alive and well in Lebanon 
and arguably acted as a catalyst in translating the general 
growing public dissatisfaction with the Lebanon intervention 
1nto a tangible political force. In the end, th8 American 
value system could not support continued intervention in 
Lebanon. The Administration reacted to, or at least paral-
leled, this lack of support and eventually ended the i~ter­
vention. 
G. CONCLUSION 
The American public ultimately did not support interven-
tion in Lebanon. Dissension over the Administration's 
policies evolved and grew over time as it became increasiDg-
ly clear that the goals of intervention could not be 
achieved at a reasonable cost. The public was also unclear 
about whether the administration itself understood and could 
pursue the goals it had set for itself. 
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The potential for U.S. involvc~cnt in Lebanon to esca-
late certainly played a part in increasing the A~erican 
public's perceived potential costs of the irtervcnt:on. The 
United States could have bc~n dragged into a wider Arab-
Isracl i conflict, or worse, even into d~rect fighting with 
~he Soviet Union. There was also a real potential for U.S. 
forces to be stuck ~n Lebanon indefinitely, sinking deeper 
and deeper into that state's strife-ridd0n mcrass. 
The global and regional reactions to U.S. intervention 
provided little consolation to the Anerican public. The 
local Arab ard Israeli states did not necessarily share the 
Administration's goals, and resented U.S. meddlinc; in their 
regional affairs. Washington's European allies provided 
some forces and even encouragement, but in the end lost 
confidence in Anerica's or anyone else's ability to untangle 
the web of Lebanese sectarian violence. It is not unreason-
able to assert t~at this international ambivalence contrib-
uted to the ultimate :eeling in America that their forces 
were stuck and nobody was going to come to their aid. 
Eventually, Europeans arsued against these forces even using 
offensive tactics for self-protection, contributing to the 
feeling among many Americans that their "boys" were being 
left in a lurch. 
These feelings of increased potential costs and interna-
tional isolation combined with the realization of unattain-
able goals anC. caused a vast majority of Americans to with-
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draw c,upport for intcn·ention in Lebanon. By the late fall 
of 1983 it was clear tha~ the potential costs clearly did 
not justify any possiole gair.s. The A~~rican public contin-
ued to support their forces and these forces' ability to 
conduct operations to defend the~selves, but overall support 
for th~ goals and methods of intervention waned. It is not 
surprising that the Ad~inistration picked up on this senti-
ment and was seeking a graceful exit from Lebanon hy January 
1984. Finally, even a graceful exit was too much to ask and 
President Reagan ordered the "redeployment" of troops off-
shore in February, allowing the American people to put the 
Lebanese intervention behind them. 
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V. CONGRESS AND THE PP-..:SIDI:":!iT 
The previous cases traced public attitudes during the 
course of two American interventions in the early to mid 
1980s. 115 In each case, the President failed to gain public 
support for an intarvention decision. In N~caragua, the 
~eagan ad~inistratio~ failed to ~ake a case that direct 
military intervention would achieve worthwhile objectivas. 
In Lebanon, reluctant e~rly acquiescence gave WdY to an 
overwhelmi~g public desire to end the ordeal as objectives 
became muddled and costs, both in ~lood and prestige, esca-
lated. 
This study has argu~d that public reactions in both 
cases were affected if not molded by three primary factors: 
fear of escalation, global/regional reaction, and an eventu-
al affront to the American value system. The question 
remains, though, of how public opinion in each o: these 
cases was eventually trar.slated i~to non-intervention poli-
cy. Public opinion ~as not ~he only factor affecting the 
President's decisions to be sure. But it ce~tainly was one 
factor, and arguably the most important determinant of his 
policy. 
In this age of instant polls it might re tampting to 














tant ~s ~ilit1ry intcrvrntion. And indeed, it has J:,een 
docu~c~tcd that Prcsidcn~ Reagan had a large staff devoted 
to poll ~atchin; 116 . But this possibility, appealing though 
it may be to those in t!ie majority on a give )ssue, is much 
too sinplistic. Raw ~~blic opinion data can be but one 
force acting upon the President's decision-makjng process. 
In reality th8 pJblic will passes through a filtering proc-
ess that includes the Congress and, to a lesser extent, the 
President's own bureaucracy.117 
A direct if slow process occurs between the ~ublic and 
its elected or appointed representatives in the l~gislative 
and executive branches. First and of foremost importance, 
Congress car1 (or should) act as a conduit for the public 
will. But c major impediment to this idyllic goal is Con-
gress's own inability or unwillingness to share responsibil-
ity for American intervention cbroad. This problem is best 
illustrated by the relative impoten~e of the War Powers Act 
of 1973, which was designed to give Congress a greater say 
over whether and for how long the President could commit 
U.S. troops in hostilities. In reality, C~ngress has tak~n 
decisive action only when it has enjoyed a clear mandate of 
overwhelming public dissatisfaction with the Presid~nt's 
policy, or when public apathy has run rampant. Congress has 
in effect abrogated its oversight rP.sponsibility for making 
war as delineated in the Constitut~on, even as its overall 
foreign policy clout has increased since the Vietnam 
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war. 
Conver::;1 ly, the executive brcinch and the ;:iedia rnay have 
a top down infl~cnce on public opinion. This possibility 
has been studied to ascertain who affects whom, i.e. does 
public opinion influence policy-makers, or do policy-makers 
mold public opinion to their predetermined decisioi1s. No 
cle3r cut answ0r exists, but ther~ app~ars to be a recipro-
cal process that ultimately favor3 public opinion's predowi-
nance in the foreign policy decision-making process. 118 
A. REPRESENTATION 
Does public opinion ultimately affect the i.1terver.tion 
decision, and if so how? The President obviously makes the 
decision to send troops abroad as Commander in Chief. But 
Congress's rising powEr in foreign policy has obligated the 
executive to consider Capitol Hill's opinions as well. This 
increasing congressional role begs the questions, should 
legislators be tied by their constituents' opinions, i.e. 
does the public really know what is good policy; and the 
second question, do representatives in Congress follow their 
constituents' opinions? A negative reply to either of these 
queries removes the public from the decision loop and irn-
plies a top down "public be damned" process. While this 
"elite" decision-making process may have had nerit in the 
past, it apparently does not apply in today's world of mass 
communication and global awareness 119 . 
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Should Opinion M~kc Policy? 
Alcxi3 de Tocqueville, in his eloquent nineteenth 
century observations of the Anerica~ de~~cracy, foresaw a 
danger in foreign policy resulting from intense ~ocd swings 
from private self-interest to passionate, even religious 
idyllic zeal. These swings, he assr~ted, nay h~\e bee, 
acceptable and even proper in donestlc ;olitics where the 
peop~e had a fir~ grasp of the issues. But volatile mood 
swings had no pJ.ace in foreign policy, where no mac;s exper-
tise existed and the consequences of failure were much 
higher120 . Gabriel Alli10nd expandBd on de Tocqueville' s 
worries in the 1940s and 1950s to develop what is now called 
mood theory. 
Americans, according to Almond, have a low specific 
heat. They grow warn suddenly and ecol off with equal 
rapidity. Americans also place an extreme premium on 
achievement. These factors combine to form volatile and 
shortsighted opinions on foreign policy. This is not due to 
a lack of enthusiasm. Almond described an ~merica with 
tremendous elan, which could work wonders. But when elan 
failed, the mood would shift and foreign policy would suf-
fer121. The Vietnam syndrome could certainly be described in 
this light. Since these characteristics would combine to 
make reass American opinion on foreign policy volatile and 
shortsighted, it would be best to place foreign policy in 
the hands of a competent elite, responsible to mass constit-
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ucncics, but better able to ~akc stable and rational dcci-
sions 12 ~. 
de Tocqucville·s and Almond's fea~s of a volatile 
mass public had more ~erit in their times than in the 
p-resent. Frankl in Roos2vel t, for exa::ipl'.:?, was certainly 
correct when he eased the nation into World War II despite 
an isoiationist publi8. His elite decision-making apparatus 
arguably survived his administration and flourished well 
into the 1960s 123 . But modern studies (1970s on) have dis-
credited mood theory124 . Today's public, it seems, is nei-
ther rnoouy nor volatile. It is not unifor~ly uninterested 
or uninformed about foreign policy issues, although pockets 
of ignorance and ap~thy inevitably exist125 . It follows, 
then, that if a democracy's public opinion on foreign af-
fairs is relatively interested, informed, ar.d stable, the 
public should enjoy a say in its foreign FOlicy. Evidence 
does seem to support ~he assertion that policy fol.lows 
opinion, although the relationship is sonetimes tenuous and 
always conditional. 
2. Does Policy Follow Opinion? 
It should not be surprising that as public awareness 
has increased, so too has the effect of public opinion on 
congressional and, ultimately executive policy. Studies in 
the 1960s and early 1970s indicated that constituents' 
attitudes had little impact on C0ngressi26 . But these find-
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ings h~vc been updated in the 1980s by stu~ics that suggest 
policy changes do i~2ccd succeed opinion changes, and that 
foreign policy issues do have a strong imp~ct on 
electi0ns127 . But opini0n's impact is not always direct, n0r 
even consistent. Other factors atfect the efficiency and 
purity of opinion's ascent to ~olicy. 
Success or failure in international policy, it has 
been argued, is a function of domestic political develop-
ments. Foreign policy strategy is aimed as much at home 
constituents as at ~riends and enemies abroad 123 The public 
has taken an interest in foreign policy, and has often held 
its elected representatives responsible for policy failures. 
This has been especially true since the Vietnam war. For-
eign policy has thus become, in effect, a domestic political 
issue, subject to many cf the same constraints as tradi~ion-
al domestic politics. For this reason, Congress's rise in 
foreign policy involve~ent since Vietnam has not been met 
with universal admiration. A strong case can be made that 
U.S. foreign policy has been trapped in the web of congres-
sional politics, and so reflects the "distortions, limita-
tions, and incoherence" of Ameri~an domestic policy129 . To 
some degree, this effect is an inevitable consequence of 
America's representative form of government. Legi3lators 
must seek reelection to keep their jobs. This means that 
their actions will most often be geared toward pleasing (or 
at least not offendjng) their constituents' sensibilities. 
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Some ineff iciencics should be expected, and even hoped for 
in many cases. The picture of a Congress or executive 
catering to every whin of public opinion is as fall1cious as 
is that cf an i~munc elite guiding U.S. policy ove1 complex 
and treacherous shoals. 
Policy-makers, including Congress, can in fact 
exercise considerable autonomy when the public is not deci-
sively bent in o~e direction or the other. What this means 
for the executive-congressional relationship is th~t when 
Congress is faced with a policy choice between even a popu-
lar president and clear constituent interest, popular opin-
ion will always win. But if no clear interest exists, 
Congress ~iil follow either the President or its own leader-
ship130 . Thomas Graham's study was able to quantify this 
observation wit~ a scale ranging from less than fifty per-
cent of public support to eighty-plus percent. At the lower 
support levels (<50%), opinion rarely influences decision-
~akers. Opinions' influenc2 increases, though, until at 
eighty percent and above it dominates the entire political 
process and ''sweeps all political opposition away." 131 It 
appears, though, that these percentages must reflect n~t 
just the level of support for a policy, but also implicitly 
the level of interest. The vctst majority of Americans who 
understood U.S. involvement in Nicaragua iD 1983-1984, for 
example, opposed that. involvemPnt. But these people repre-
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scntcd only a quarter of tne population. This conpctra:.ive 
ignorance gave the President a~d C0n9ress considerable 
latitude, seer.iingly reinforcing "elite" the0r~es of dcci-
sion-mc.king. But the situation soon changed. Fi..ibl ic oppo-
sition became deeper and wider a3 i~forrnation surfaced about 
U.S. and contra mQlfeas~nce. 
Hedrick Smith applied a concept known as "widening 
the circle" tJ the Nicaraguan exa~ple 132 . The model de-
scribes a p:::-ocess in which the losing (dissentir.g) side 
wiL~ens the circle of "knowers 11 until a new _t)ower base is 
formed. In the Nicaraguan case, covert assistance to the 
contras eventually became overt due to leaks etc., and 
obnoxious acts were brought to the public's attenticn to 
garner support for l~ssening the U.S. involvement there. 
The audience was eventually drawn into the fi~ht and ulti-
mately determined the outcomel 33 . 
Special interests also influence represEn~ation in 
foreign policy. Many of these groups command resources in 
organiiation, information, funding, and pol i -cical connec-
tions that allow them to influence policy-makers in ways 
that often see~ out of proportion to their actual ~epresen-
tation. These lobbying efforts can tak~ on dramatic propor-
tions, such as dumping fifteen million postcards on the 
House leader's desk in a single day134 . Lobbying efforts can 
also consist of constant behind tt.e scenes wranglir • .;. 
Perhaps ~he best known foreign policy irterest is 
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the so-called Jewish lobby. Their power i~ amply illustrat-
ed bf the A.~erican Israeli Public Affairs Committee (A1PAC) 
and its ability to shape arms sales policy in the Middle 
£ast. It has been reported that when the R?agan adninistra-
tion wanteu an arms packa~e for the Saudis in 1986, Secre-
tary of State George Shultz negotiated directly with AIPAC 
director Tome Dine to solicit congressional approva1 135 . 
Shultz knew Congress woJld never approve the sale without 
AIPAC support, ~o he went straight to the power source. 
Similarly, active lob~ying by human rights and church groups 
in the early 1980s provided a cushion of support for con-
gressmen dissenting from Reagan's Central American poli-
cies136. 
Certainly special interest lobbying, which has 
sometimes euptemistically been called ethnic pork, has 
i: .. p'lc:ted U.S. foreign policy, and interventio;-i decisions in 
particular. B~t even powerful special interests can succumb 
to the public will. There are, after all, special interests 
on either side of a given issue. Somebody must lose. That 
somebody is generally the side that fails to convince Con-
gress and/or the President that public opinion is on their 
side. 127 
Thus far it has been argued that public opinion is 
stable, interested, and in the long term, informed. enough to 






tenet ~f this belief is the assu~ption that basic values and 
belief syste~s play a larger role in framing public atti-
tudes than do the details of any particular case. What 
~atters in the final analysis is the overall perception of 
the policy, i.e. its "rightness" or "wrongni::?ss" based upon 
the Sliding Factors that have been a continuous thread 
throughout this study. The argurr.ent has also been present-
ed that policy can follow opinion, or more accurately, that 
strong opinion forces a change in a President's intervention 
policy, generally as a result of increased congressional 
interest. By returning briefly to the lwo case studies, it 
can be seen that Congress does work as the primary vehicle 
(albeit an inefficient one) for opinion's ascent to policy. 
B. OPINION'S ASCENT TO POLICY ·· CASE STUCIES 
1. Nicaragua 
The Nicaraguan case - even in the brief period 
considered - provides an example of congressional inaction, 
followed by an increasingly activist role as public ire 
became: aroused. Congressional moves were afoot in tr.e 
summer of 1983 to cut off Reagan's ccntra aid - especially 
in the House. But information and interest among the public 
and in Congress were lacking at these early stages. The 
tide began to turn, though, as even the administration's 
allies were alienated by being left o~t of the decision 
loop. Large-scale military exercises in AJgust 1983, for 





But Reagan still ~ad friends in the Senate and was able to 
maintain $24 million in contra aid that fall, despite two 
separate House vctes to eliminate it139 . The House would 
prevail, though, in 1984. 
Two events came to light in 1984 that turned the 
tide and caused policy to be dictated to the Reagan adn:inis-
tration. The first was the CIA's mining of Nicaraguan 
harbors. This incident outraged even staunch Republicans 
like Barry Goldwater, who gave CIA director William Casey a 
thorough public scolding over the incident140 . Less than a 
month after the mining became public, House leader Jim 
Wright led a more activist movement ~ith his famous "Dear 
Comrnandante 11 letter to Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega. 
Wright said he and his cosigners opposed U.S. armed inter-
vention and sought a reconciliation process. Needless to 
say, this act was looked upon with outrage by the more 
conservative congressional minority1 41 . 
7he second incident was the so-called assassination 
manual - written for the con~ras by the CIA - that became 
public in the fall of 1984. The administration's $28 mil-
lion contra aid request had already been passed by the 
Senate and rejectec by the House {as in the previous year) 
when details of the manual became public. This seems to 
have been the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back, 
though, and the request was cut in the conference commit-
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tee 142 . In :he end, Congress asserted itself by cutt:ng off 
the purse strings for Reagan's policy. Even the previousl~· 
described MIG scare ~ould not convince Congress to support 
U.S. intervention in Nicaragua, eithe~ directly or in sup-
port of the contras. 
2. Lebanon 
The Lebanon case prov1d~s another example of initial 
congressioral deference to th~ executive giving way to 
activism in the face of public unease. The executive-
congressional battle over Lebanon was fought mostly within 
the framework of the War Powers Act of 1973 (WPA). This act 
was passed over President Richard Nixon's veto to givt the 
Congress a stronger voice in ~hen, w'.ere, and how U.S. 
troo~s would be committed overseas. 143 Briefly, the act 
should be invoked whenever U.S. troops face imminent hostil-
ities. Three major requirements are enumerated. F~rst. the 
President should consult with Congress prior to the inter-
vention decision bBing taken. Second, the President should 
submit to Congress a report detailing the U.S. force commit-
ment within forty-eight hours of that event. And third, 
this report starts a sixty day clock, after which U.S. 
troops must be withdrawn if Congress does not specifically 
authorize their continued commitment. Implementing the act 
has proven to be very problematic for reasons that wlll be 
discussed later. But first, it is interesting to examine 
the battle that went on over the act during the Lebanon 
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intervention. 
President Reagan refused to cite the WPA in either 
the initial August or later September 1982 Marine deploy-
ments in Beirut. He did submit a report to Conqress "con-
sistent with" rather than "p~rsuant to" WPA. But he did not 
start the sixty day clock because there was "no in.tentio~1 or 
expect~tion that U.S. Armed Forces will become involved in 
hostilities. 11144 And indeej, U.S. forces did not become 
involved in significa~t hostilities for a number of months. 
Relatively weak congressional calls for a larger role for 
itself were virtually ignored by the administration during 
this pe1·iod. 
The WPA debatP was rekindled in August 1983 when 
Marine~ began dying in Beirut. Initial congressional calls 
for a WPA debate were resisted by the administration, which 
claimed only :•sporadic" fighting. But congressional threats 
~o cut off funds for the Marines within thirty days brought 
the administration to the table145 . A joint resolution was 
agreed upon in early October 1983 that technically invoked 
the WPA (although Reagan ~id not recognize this) and estab-
lished, amoni other things, an eighte~n month limit to U.S. 
involvement in Leba~on 14 6. This resoluti0n, as well as 
continued support for administration policy, was aided to a 
large extent by the efforts of House speaker Tip O'Neill. 
It was also O'Neill ~ho staunchly defended the Marines' 
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9resence following the ba1·racks bombing of 23 October 1983, 
although his support clearly started to wane as the cold 
winter set in on Washington, and on the administration's 
policies. 
The tide began to turn against the administration 
following the barracks bombi~g. The public was growing 
weary of war in Lebanon, and congressional dissenters were 
gaining support. Congress adjourned on 18 November with 
legislation pending in each house t.hat would limit the 
Marines' stay to two or three months at most. Even Speaker 
O'Neill said time was running out for the 3dministration to 
prove its policies could work, although he was no~ yet 
prepared tu reverse his own policyl47. That would come 
later. 
By January the public and Congress had had e>.!1ough of 
Lebanon. The administration manag€d to fend c~f attacks 
until early February, when the Democratic caucus passed a 
resolution calling for the "prompt and orderly withdrawal" 
of U.S. forces 148 . Reagan said he would ignore this resolu-
tion, but in fa~t plans were already being made for the 
redeployment of Marines to offshore naval units. 
3. A Slow Steady Climb 
In each of the cases presented here, public dissat-
isfaction was eventually followed by increased congressional 
activism, which arguably led to changes in the President's 





demonstrate that affecting policy in any meaningful way 
through congre~sionnl action can take months or even years. 
This delay w~s what the WPA was supposed to fix, but it 
obviously did not. If Congr~ss is the peoples' voice, 
should it take that long for the people to be heard? Cer-
tainly Congress can act as buffer between public whim and 
foreign policy, smoothing the transient crests and troughs 
uhile steering a course to maintain the overall current. 
But in both of these cases, Congress was slow to act, even 
with the lux1.iry of over,.,~.-<?lming public dissatisfaction over 
the President's policy. How, then, can Congress heal itself 
and be a more timely player in intervention policy? The 
answer may still lie in the WPA, but changes must be made. 
C. WAR POWERS AND CONGRESS - LIMITED CONSENSUS 
The War Powers Act re3ulted from congressional moves to 
expand its foreign policy role following the U.S. involve-
ment in Vietnam. S~ddenly the people cared about foreign 
pol icy aJ.j Congress, as the most direct representative of 
the people, sought to assert it~ role in that hitherto 
presidential realm. Americans were better informed and had 
a first-hand knowledge of the effects bad policy c~~ld 
produce. They therefore were willing to extend the U.S. 
system of checks and balances tn the foreign policy arenal50, 
Unfortunately, while Congress was willing to take on this 








deficient in affecting the interventio~ decision. Its 
structure and its ~sychology are not amenable to the deci-
siveness a~d risk-taking required to decide an issue as 
complicated and politically charged as intervention. 
The 1970s saw Congress move m~re toward~ a horizontal 
structure than had previously been the case. Xoung members 
wanted more of a say in policy. The result was an overhaul 
of the committee and caucus systems that took much power 
from the patriarchal leadership. In short, there was a 
diffusion of powerl51. This diffusion was good in some 
respects. It allowed more and varied opinions and insights. 
It took power away from the few and placed it in the hands 
of the many, which is intuitively appealing for a democracy. 
But decentralized or diffused power has had its draw-
backs as well, especlally where war powers are concernad, 
The new process haL left nobody singularly accountable for 
congressional intervention decisions152. In effect, every-
body is in charge, which really means nobody is in charge. 
Also, thls situation provides few political incentives for 
sticking one's neck out, while acquiescence - or better yet, 
ineffectual diss_nsion - usually carries neutral political 
effects, and may even be advantageou3. This points to the 
real problem, which is that Congress does not wish to s!1are 
in the intervention decision because it fears "the interna-
tional consequences of compelling a [U.S.] withdrawal (and) 




was certainly borne out in Lebanon. No sconer had Congress 
sanrtioned interventio.1 for eighteen months than the Marine 
barracks in Beirut was bombed, killing 241 Marin~s. Con-
gress was forced to share the blame for flawed policy (and 
even tactics), even though it had little or nothing to do 
with that policy's formulation and implementation. It did 
not take long for Congress to regroup and withdraw the carte 
blanc it had given the administration. But the mood on the 
Hill was that they had been duped into sharing the blame for 
failed policy, while there was little chance of receiving 
credit had the policy worked. It is interesting, though, 
that the congressional reaction was not one of retreat, but 
a resurgent activism to end U.S. intervention. Perhaps it 
had nothing to lose at that point. 
The Nicaraguan experience was similar. Congress ap-
proved contra aid in 1983, only to be embarrassed by the 
mining and "assassination manual" incidents, after which it 
stood up to the administration. Was Congress reacting to 
and ctanneling public opinion? This study argues y8s. Did 
Congress play a timely role? Certainly not. But these 
cases do not negate the possibility that Congress can play a 
positive and timely role in the intervention decision. 
D. DEMOCRATIZING INTERVENTION 
It has been stated here that Congress is the branch most 
in touch with public desires. It is most responsive to 
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currents in public opinion, especially the House with its 
two year election cycle154 . It would be a mockery of this 
nation's democratic principles, then, if Congress were 
denied a voice in the intervention decision. The fcunding 
fathers called for such a role in Article I of the Constitu-
tion, empowering the Congress to raise armies and declare 
war. Congressional involvement in the intervention decision 
legitimizes the act in the democratic process. It creates a 
bor.d between the people and their government that acknowl-
edges intervention's potential costs and legitimizes its 
objectives. Harry Summers, in his treatise on the Vietnam 
War, goes so far as calling for a congressional declaration 
of war in significant interventior.s. S~;n.~ers claims that a 
decJaration is like a marriage cer~ificate. It legitimizes 
the relationship (between governm~nt and people) anct an-
nounces it to the world155 . The effects and the advantages 
of congressional participation go deeper than this, though. 
Certainly a democratic basis for means and ends in 
intervention :s preferable to the old model of elite 
policy-makers and a largely ignorant public. This basis 
would emerge through acknowledg~d debate within Congress and 
under the public eye156. This, of course, shculd occur 
before the int~rvention decision is made. But the longer 
term benefit of congressional involvement is in its abili-
ties as an overseer of policy. The inadequacies of Congress 









Congress is well suited, though, to ~ct as a revie~ing body 
or as a board of Jirectors. Congress could d~aw upon its 
considerable knowledge and expertise ~o examine policy in 
light of its ''shareholders'" wishes157 . The appropriateness 
of this role has been acknowledged by prominent membPrs of 
Congress, including Senator Les Aspin158 . Despite this 
acknowledgement, though, an institutionalized oversight 
system was not achieved in the 1980s. The culprit again 
seems to be a lacking, or at least a conditional willingness 
to acc€pt shared responsibility for the possible conse-
quen~es of intervention. In the beginning phases of the 
Lebano~ interventior., for example, the Republican head of 
the Senate Foreign Relations CoMmittee claimed that "There 
is a wil~ingr.ess by Congress to share resp~nsibility with 
the President in [thf"' interver.tion). 11159 Bu"=. whe:-i President 
Reagan refused to share that responsibility, Congress was 
unwilling or unable to press the issue until nine months 
later when dead Americans '.vt..6 being shipped home. 
Senator Joseph Biden D-Del supported an amendment in 
June 1984 that would have restricted the use of U.S. troops 
in Central America, stating that the Prasident should ~el­
come the law as a basis for building popular and co~1gres­
sional support160 . Again, Reagan demurred and Congress did 
not assert its role until the fall, wh~n direct U.S. mili-
tary intervention was ~ very real possibility. In both of 
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these cases, Congress deferrec t-o the executive bran.::h on 
whether and how much intervention should take place until 
significant losses in U.S. personnel and/or prestige had 
already taken place. One could certainly expand the Nicara-
gua case to include the Iran/Contra affair and reach the 
same conclusion. 
Congress simply has not exercised the policy oversight 
role carved out for it in the Constitution. The War Powers 
Act is the most notable attempt at asserting this power, but 
it too has been lacking. Authorities on the subject have 
delineated several changes that might make the WPA more 
salient to the intervention decision. Some of the more 
pertinent ones include:l 61 
Require congressional approval prior to intervention 
except in well defined emergencies. 
Stren1then the provision requiring the President to 
report 11 in every possible instance." The President has 
often dt?emed it "impossible" to report U.S. troop com-
mitment in a timely manner. 
Form a standing consultative body within Congress to 
consult with the President prior to and during an inter-
vention. 
The first two suggestions require the President to 
formulate and articulate his objectives early in the inter-
vention process, and allow for a timely review by Congress. 
All three suggestions force Congress to shoulder its share 
of responsibility for intervention. 'fhe standing consulta-
tive body would place somebody or some group in charge of 















people \;ould be resp8nsible for and, theoretically, conscien-
tious in their efforts. These provisions would force the 
President to consult., and compel congress t0 share responsi-
bility for i~tervention. They would also allow early and 
continuous congressional oversight and i ~p··~ into interven-
tion policy. Such a policy should benefit from the thoughts 
of as wide an array of expertise - r.~litary and political -
as possible. Congress has much too of fer in the latter re-
spect. 
Caspar Weinberger, in his famous six tests for U.S. 
intervention, stated that 11 ••• there must be some reasonable 
assurance we will have the support of the American people 
and their elected representatives in Congress ... " Unfortu-
nately, there is no workable formal mechanism to achieve 
this noble goal. The time is past when foreign policy 
Alites can commit the United States to foreign adventures 
with little regard to public opinion. Congress, ~ith its 
fingers on the pulse of domestic political rhythms, is far 
better suited than the President to ascertain whether or not 
intervention is an acceptable alternative to the American 
people. Congress must become a full partner in the int~r-
vention decisi0n-making process. This means sharing respon-
sibility, which is politically ~isky. But if the decisions 


















































A. INTERVENTION AND DEHOCnACY 
It has been assc~ted here that the United States has 
shown a varying propensity to intervene militarily, and that 
this varying propensity is a product of two primary deci-
sion-ruaking processes. First, Core Factors are analyzed by 
decision-makers to make a rational analysis of whether, 
given the materials and conditions at hand, victory is 
attainable at a cost conun9nsurate with the national inter-
est. 
The second process used by decision-makers, and the one 
of primary interest to this study, is where public support 
regarding the potential intervention is formed and acted 
upon. It has been argued that public opinion can be meas-
ured by examining three primary Sliding Factors: fear of 
escalation, global/regional reaction, and liberal values. 
If decision-makers can identify agents within the interven-
tion that will act upon these factors, and predict accurate-
ly how the public wi~l perceive these factors, leaders can 
then assess whether the intervention will be supported by 
the American people. Furthermore, U.S. leaders can take 
these factors into account as they formulate intervention 
policy to ensure initial and ongoing public support, if 
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intervention should prove necessary. It is certainly within 
the pur:iew of military strategic planners to examine these 
factors and es+:.imate their effects on public opinion. It 
seems the JCS gave plan~ers their marching orders with the 
statement, quoted previously, that the U.S. has the mean3 to 
fight in LIW, provided it has "the political will to act 
promptly and decisively and the national will to endure the 
conflict" (my emphasis). The military would do well to 
understand the relationships betwe~n the public will and 
intervention. All planning, after ~l~, ultimately depends 
upon that will in our democracy. 
It is not enough, though, to say that public opinion 
affects the initial intervention decision. Sustain1 ,d public 
support is necessa:y to carry out an intervention ?Olicy to 
a succe3sful con=lusion. The Lebanon case pre vided an 
example where increasing public displeasure over interven-
tion policy contributed to that policy's failure by forcing 
an American withdrawal, although it is certainly arguable 
that the policy was doomed from the start. The public just 
seemed to perceive that more quickly than did the adminis-
tration. 
Finally, the study has pointed out the role Congress 
plays as a c~nduit between public opinion and the President. 
The executive has the power to make intervention decisions. 
But Congress, as the most direct representative of the 








see presidential pol~~y. Even as Congress's foreign policy 
clout has increased over the past two decades, its role in 
thi= intenention decision has remair.ed minimal. Congress's 
views have prevailed eventually, as in Lebanon and Nicara-
gua, but its role has hardly been timely. 
Congress shculd assert its constitutional prerogative as 
the branch vested with war-making powers. The executive 
bra~ch need not abdicated its role as policy-maker for 
Congress to reach its rightful place as the people's voice. 
Congress should act as a consultative body prior to and 
during military inter~ention, as well as an oversight body 
lor guiding policy, although the President is still much 
more aptly suited for making policy in the first place. 
These mutually understood roles would ensure that presiGen-
ti.~l policy was in tune with the nation's feelings, and 
raise the prosp2cts for its success by including the people 
- through their ccngressional agents - in the intervention 
decision. Nothing could be ~ore important to the succes; of 
any policy decision in today's environment of heightened 
awareness brought on by th.a "CNN" g~r.eration of Americans. 
One ~rea that ~nly ~mplicitly come3 out of this study is 
the role of dvmestic priortties in the intervention deci-
sion. Certainly events at home will affect the public's and 
Congress's affinity for interv8ntion as a fo=eign policy. 



























~eepen and its citizens tend to look inward, it may well be 
that for2ign policy wilJ. suffer. This study has concentrat-
ed upon how the factors of a particular intervention affect 
public opinion towards that policy. It would be useful to 
expand the research to examine how factors not ~elating to a 
particular event, but more "signs of the times" affect 
opinions towards 0::1 intervention. 
B. BROAD!~ING THE BASE - ADDITIONAL CASiS 
The two detailed cases presented here seem to support 
the study' s hypotheses. 'l'able 6 .1 su:m.1T!arizes the effects of 
































It would be useful, though, tc apply the Sliding Factors 
model to othe~ in;erventions and further scrutinize its 
validity. This final sectio~ is a cursory attempt at just 
that . Table 6.2 illustrates a "first look·' attempt at 
classifying five policy decisions made by the 'J11ited StatP-s 
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I since the 1950s, as well as the Nicaragua and Lebanon cases 
presented pceviously. 
TABLE 6.2 
Fear of World Liberal 
Dates ~ount~ Escalation R2c.ction Values Interve!"le 
N/A Optimum T T T y 
interv. 
N/A Opt. 
Non-Int. A A A N 
9/83-11/84 NICARAGUA A A A N 
8/82-2/84 LEBANON A A T-?\* Y-N 
7/58-10/58 LEBANON A T T y 
4/65-9/66 ~M. REP. T A T y 
8/68-10/68 CZECH. A A T N 
1/87-8/88 P. GULF T T T y 
8/90- IRAQ A-T T 'I' y 
*indicates effects cha~ged during in~erv~ntion 
Briefly, a "T" indicates that facto~ influenced public 
opinioi1 Toward supporting an interventionist policy by the 
United States. Conversely, an "A" indicates that public 
opinion :tuoved Away from supporting intervention as a policy 
option. The Lebanon casP. illustrated how a sliding factor 
co~ld chang~ during an intervention, eventually resulting in 
changed !JOlicy. In that case, American values became re-
pulsed by the increasing costs of intervention, while at the 
Pame time the policy's objectives lost credibility. The 
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/ recent Desert Storm campaign had a similar resuJt, except in 
fear of escalation. Prior to the military phase, many 
Americans were warning of thousands of U.S. casualties if 
the conflict escalated out of control, as some argued it 
would. This fear was not realized over the conflict's 
course, though, and fear of escalation lost much of its 
importance. 
It is also interesting to note that one overriding 
co.·,cern can cancel the effects of all other factors. The 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, for instance, elicited 
strong value-oriented arguments and near universal cond~mna­
tion. But a fear of war with the Soviets certdinly pervaded 
and influenced the U.S. decision to limit its protests below 
the level of milita~y action. It may be that in this case, 
the Core Factor analysis yielded an answer that intervention 
could not be successful an a cost commensurate with American 
national interests. As an aside, this case also illustrates 
the fact that global/regional reactioo, if it is to affect 
U. s. opinion, must emanate from a credible source. The 
Warsaw pact nations, for instance, did not condemn the 
invasion of Czechoslovakia. But that probably had less 
ifilpact on American feelings than did reactions from other 
countries, NATO mer.ibers for instance. 
It is also interesting to note the only case in which 
all three Sliding Factors influenced opinion towards sup-
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porting intervention - the reflagging operation in the 
Persian Gulf. It should come as no surprise to the reader 
by now that this was ~lso considered a successful operation. 
That the pll.blic generally approved of the reflagging can 
be explained in light of the Sliding Factors presented. 
There was little fear of escalation, although the shooting 
of the Stark, the mining of the Roberts, and the Vincenne's 
downing of an Iranian Airbus all illustrated that the policy 
was not risk free. Also, the reflagging was widely support-
ed in the international community, largely because much of 
that community needed the oil that U.S. ships were protect-
ing. And finally, an appeal to "Freedom of navigation" and 
free commerce appealed to, or at least did not offend, the 
liberal value system. These factors certainly combined to 
influence public opinion towards supporting the interven-
tion, or at least not actively opposing it as W8re the cases 
in Nicaragua and Lebanon. 
Finally, these measures should be seen for what they 
are, highly subjective and difficult to qua~tify. While 
this study has been far from anecdotal, future research 
would benefit from more rigorous attempts at quantifying the 
relationships between the various factors presented here, 
and by validating these factors against a larger spectrum of 
cases. 
There is convincing evidence, though, that public opin-
ion pl~ys a major part in the long term success of any 
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intervention policy. The Sliding Factors presented here 
should provide accurate gauges of whether an intervention 
will meet with popular approval and_. ~:ore importantly, 
assist in the framing intervention policy to ensure that 
decision-makers include the all-important ractor of public 
approval in their intervention policy. r:;:...) do otherwise 
usurps the ideals of democracy and, more practically, dooms 

























NICARAGUA TIME LINE 
President Reagan signs finding, r~questing $45 
million to aid Contras and "(put] pressure on the 
Sandinistas and their Allies to cease (asscf-ftance] 
to leftist guerrillas in El Salvador." 1 Con-
gress ultimately rejects request. 
U. s. forces L1vade Grenada, in part to evacuate 
U.S. citizens. Invasion is widely supported by 
U.S. public an~ ~ongress. SecDef compares Nicara-
gua to Grenada 6 • Nicaragua conseqt:.ently guaran-
tees u.s. citizens' safety. 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, 
Guatemala approve "Contadora" peace plan. 
CIA-controlled operatives begin mining several 
Nicaraguan harbors, eventually destroying g~ 
damaging nine ships and fishing vessels. 1 
Mining becomes public in March and April 1984 
setting off a furor in the Congress, including 
resignation of Senator Patrick Moynihan as vice-
chairman of the Intelligence Coramittee, and a 
strong rebuke by Senat~?" Barry Goldwater to CIA 
director William casey1 . 
Kissinger Commission ~eport released. Espouses 
hard line towards Central American communism and 
largely backs President Reagan's policies. 
Nicaragua seeks military and technical assi9~ance 
form "the world" to stop U.S. intervention. 0 
U.S. announces major exercises Grenadero I and 
ocean Venture for April. To include "emergency 
deployment 1xercise"· and building of "assault 
airstrips. 16 
70 Nic~raguans.sent to Bulgal~~ for flying/mainte-
nance instruction on MIG-21. 
Nicaragua goes to World Court, accuses U.S. of 
mining its ports and assisting Contras. U.S. says 
it will not accept court's jurisdiction on Central 
American matters for a two year period. 
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Two U.S. destroyers deployed to interdict arms 
from Nicaragu~ bound for El Salvador guerrillas. 
Reagan in televised speech invokes communist 
threat and "ganocidal" tendencies of Sandinistas 
in appe.:.:i.l to "r'i.lb back" communist subversion of 
Central America. 6 
House defeats contra aid request. World Court 
orders a halt to "aggressive acts" by U.S. against 
Nicaragua . 
Secretary of State George Schulz returns from 
surp~ise visit to Managua and reaffirms U.S. hard 
line position vis a vis Sandinistas. 
Nicaraguan army cancels all leaves, charges th~B 
Washington is planning a "large scale assault." 1 
Sena~e kills $21 million contra aid bill by 88-1 
margin. 
Sena~or Patrick Moynihan warns Nicaragua not to 
import warplanes, saying ~t could turn a regional 
crisis into a global one. 1 1 
Nicaraguan Defense Minister Humberto Ortega an-
nounces Nicaragua will have their air base and 
pilot training completed by early 1985, are ac-
tively seeking MIGs. 
Nicaragua anncunces it will sign Contadora treaty. 
U.S. sponsors new proposal, citing faults of 
current text. 
Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega claims in U.N. 
speech that U.S. is planning an invasion fo~ 15 
Oct. U.S. calls claim "nonsense." 
10/15/84 CIA manual for contras advocating political assas-
sination, mob violence, and blackmail becomes 
public. Public and congressional reaction are 
immediate c..nd strongly negative. Reagan calls it 
"much ado about nothing." 
11/84 U.S. forces conducting seven separate land and 
naval exercises in Central American region. 
Exercises reportedly complemented by SR-71 flights 





Nicaraguan elections. Sandinistas receive 67% of 
vo+:e. U.S. calls elections a "sha:ru. 11 Major 
opposition boycotts vote. 
U.S. ele~tions. Reagan wins by a landslide. U.S. 
announces that Soviet vessel Bakuriani is ready to 
unload MIGs for Nicaraguan Air Force. 
Nicaraguans deny HIGs inbound. Say U.S. is using 
it as a p~etext for invasion. 
11/9/84 U.S. confirms no MIGs aboard Bakuriani, but ~ther 
sophisticated hardware, including helicopte~s are. 
Wides~read support for military acti0n if MIGs 
ever do appear. Nicaragua mobilizes population -
calls for emergency se~sion of U.N. Security 
Council. 
11/13/84 Secretary of State Schulz denies invasion plans. 
Nicaragua continues defensive plans. 
11/14/84 U.S. shifts policy - says military actioP- could be 
justified if Nicaragua attacks neighbors or con-
tinues to supp~rt Salvadoran rebels. 
11/20/84 U.S. cites Nicaraguan threat to H~nduras. Hondu-
rans downplay threat. 
11/29/84 Secretary of Defe~1se Weinberger denies U.S. plans 
for Nicaraguan intervention. Says that policy is 
designed to "obviate the need for military in-
volvement." outlines six tests for U.S. military 
intervention, specifically stating that Nicaragua 























LEBANON TIME LINE172 
Israeli army invades Lebanon in response to Pales-
tinian border incursions and ambassador's assassi-
nation in London. 
French peacekeeping forces arrive as first contin-
gent of MNF. U.S. and Italian forces will follow. 
PLO begins evacuation from Beirut. 
800 U.S. Marines arrive at Beirut Harbor to cover 
PLO evacuation. Reagan assures Congress ~~5ines 
will stay 30 d~ys at most and avoid combat. 
Lebanese President Bashir ~emayal assassinated, 
probably by a Syrian agent.l 4 
Massacres at Shatila and Sabra Palestinian refugee 
camps by Christian militia. "Horrified" Reagan 
demands immedi~te Israeli withdrawal from 
Lebanon. 175 
Reagan agrees to send Marines back to Beirut, 
along with French, Italians, and British. 
U.S. Mdrines begin three week training program for 
a reported 75 Lebanese Army soldiers. 
Marlne Captain raises gun to stop Israel tcnks in 
sixth incident so far with IDF. 
Grenade attack on MNF patrol wounds five Marines 
and eight Italians. 
17 Americans killed as bomb wrecks U.S. embassy in 
Beirut. 
Secretary of State George Shultz embark~ on Mid-
east peace mission. Returns May 12 with an agree-
ment between Lebanon and Israel calling for simul-
taneous Israeli-Syrian withdcawal a~d normalized 
relations between Israel and Lebanon. Syria is 
not a party to pact, dooming it to failure. 
First Marine casualties. Two killed and 14 wound-








































Israelis pull out un~;~• 
ta ins to the Awwil i J :. · 




U. s. warships fire to halt ::. .. elling of Marines 
from Shouf range. Intense factional fight for 
control of Shouf mountains beginning. 
Cease-fire goes into effect, assuring greater say 
in Lebanon for Syrian;., Muslims. 
Reagan claims Syria has obtaine~6'1ew mobile SS-21 
missiles from the Soviet Union. 1 
10/12/83 Reagan signs bill authorizing Marines t~ stay in 
Lebanon 18 ~onths, after War Powers battle with 
Congress. 
10/23/83 Marine barracks at Beirut Airport bombed, killing 
241 and wounding 70. French barracks bombed 
simultaneously. 
10/25/83 U.S. torces invade Grenada, citing communist 
threat to region. 
11/29/83 September cease-fire broken with shelling of 
Marine positions. 
12/4/83 U.S. launches 28 aircraft to strike Syrian and 
Druze positions in Lebanon. Two aircraft lost, 
with one death and one airman captured. The Navy 
lieutenant would be rele3sed in January during a 
trip to Syria by presidential candidate Jesse 
Jackson. 
12/27/83 Reagan accepts blame for barracks bombing. Long 
Commission report on the bombing is released the 
following day, blaming major Marine commanders. 
Two loy-7evel commanders eventually receive repri-
mands. 7 
1/84 Heavy fighting continues to involve Marines and 
naval units offshore. 
2/7/84 Reagan announces Marine contingent will redeploy 
to ships offshore. Later claims U.S. is "not 






Marines complete redeployment, leaving ju~t 100 
men behind to guard U.S. embassy. New Jersey 
shells Druze and Syrian positions with 16 inch 
guns one hour Jfter redeployment is complete. 
President Reagan formally ends U.S. participation 




SecDef's Six Major Tests for Use of U.S. Coml:'~t Forces 
The United States should not commit forces to combat 
overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is 
deemed vital to our na~ional interest or that of our allies. 
If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a 
given situation, we should do so wh0leheartedly and with the 
clear intention of winning. If we are unwillir.g to com.i.~it 
the forczs or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, 
we should not commit them at all. 
If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we 
should have clearly defined political and military objec-
tives. And we should know precisely how our forces can 
accomplish those clearly defined obje~tives. And we should 
have and send the forces neede1 to do just that. 
The relationship ~etween our objectives and the forces we 
have committed - their siz~, composition and disposition -
must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary. 
Conditions and ob:ect~ves invariably change during the 
course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must our 
combat requirements. 
Before the United States commits combat forces abrocd, 
there must be some reasonable assurance we will hav.. .~J 
support of the American people and their elected r~presen~a­
tives in Congress. This support cannot be achievei 1nl~ss 
we are candid in making clear the threats we f~c3; the 
support cannot be sustained without continuin9 close ccn5·1l-
tation. 
The commitment of U.S. Forces to combat should be ?. last 
resort. 
Excerpt from a speech by the Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger 
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l. LIW, for this study, is defined as the direct use of 
U.S. mililary forces in combat or in a combat role for, 
clearly limited objectives, and for a limited time. The 
im~ortance of this de:inition will become more apparent as 
factors pertinent to this study surrounding LIW are ais-
cussed. Sources cf and statements on LIW are well repre-
sent.ea in Supoorting U.S. Strategy for Thirq World Conflict, 
Report of the Regional Working Group Submitted to the Com-
mission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, June 1988; George 
Bush, Nati~nal Security Strategy of the United States, March 
1991; and Dick Cheney, A~rnual Reoort to the Congre_2s and the 
rresident, January 1991. 
2. Barry M. Blechman, Ste?hen s. Kaplan, et. al. Force 
Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument 
(Washington: The Brookings-lnstitute;l977). 
3. Ibid., p. 23. 
4. Philip D. Zelikow, "Force Without War: 1975-1982," The 
Journal of Strategic Studies 7 no. 1 (Mar 1984) pp. 29-54. 
5. Herbert J. Tillema, Appeal to Force: American Interven-
tion in the Era of Containment (New York: Crowell Company, 
1973). Tillema's theory is presented in his chapter 1. 
6. Bruce Russett takes this idea ot constraints further 
with his recent work Controlling the Sword (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1990). Russett asserts that 
decision-makers "m~st put together specific policies from 
within some range of acceptable options which the mGjority 
is prepared to tolerate." p. 118. 
7. Russett, Sword, p. 102. 
8. Russell W. Neumann, The ParaJox of Mass Politics: Knowl-
edge and Oninion in the American Electorate (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 198 6) in Russett, P. 88. The 
trend has been a decreasing public awareness or interest in 
foreign policy immediately after Vietnam, with a steady 
climb since the mid 1970s. See American Public Opinion and 
U.S. 7oreign Policy 1987, ed. John E. Reilly, The Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations, 1987 
9.Much of the foundation for modern public opinion study was 
laid by Gabriel Almond, The American People and Foreign 
Policy, (New York: Frederick Praeger, 1950) and V. o. Key, 




Knopf, 1961). Key traces public opinion from its formation 
through its effects on the Amer.ican democracy. Almond is 
best known for mood theory, which will be discussed at 
greater length in chapter V. 
10. Floyd H. Allport, "To\rards a Science of Public Opinion, 11 
Public Opinion Quarterly, Jan 1937 wu.s among the first to 
effectively a~ticulate this diFtinction. 
11 o. Michael Shafer, Deadl:l Paradigms: The FailuTe of U.S._ 
Counter-Insurgency Policy (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1988) 39. This is one of five alternative approachas 
to foreign pclicy Shafer describes. 
12. Soviet Naval Diplo.nacy, ed. Bradford Dismukes, James M. 
McConnell (Princeton: P:-inceton UT"iversi ty Press, 1979) 
makes tr .. is point and also addresses the Soviet's response to 
U.S. forces. 
13. Bush, Strategy, and Cheney, Annual Report. 
14. See for example an interview with General H. Norman 
Schwarzkopf in "U.S. Commander TJrges Caution on Attacking 
Iraq," New Yorx Times, 2 liovember 1990, p. A6. 
15. Zelikow's study suggests that U.S. intervention is more 
successful when it ~ids or supports a government's behavior 
than when the intervention is meant to coerce or change 
behavior. 
16. i.e. able to provide what Shafer calls the three great 
oughts - security, good government, and progress. Shafer: p. 
105. 
17. See Richard J. Ellin<;s, Enbargoes and World Power (Boul-
der, CO: Westview Press, 1985) for a good history of sanc-
tiuns' success. Also E.W. Carter III, "Blockade," Naval 
Institute Proceedings, November 1990, pp. 42-47 makes a 
strong argument for blockade, provided there is no hurry for 
results. Finally, Kimberly A. Elliot "Evolution of U.S. 
Sanctions in the Third World," in Interven-+:ion in the 1980s: 
U.S. Foreign Poli~y in the Third WorLd, ed. Peter J. 
Schraeder ( Bf')~lder, CO: Lynne RiPnner, 1989) studies 58 
cases of li.S. sanctions and concludes their usefulnes~, 
while significant in many cases, is declining due to the 
diffusion of global economic power. 
18. The January 11 NP.w York Times contains excerpts from 
congressional and administration leaders ~spousing the 
proper roles of sanctio11s and military force. The debate 
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Future scenarios may require reli3nce upon ~~nctions, and 
indeed the sanction$ agai~st Iraq are still largely in 
place. 
19. General Accr,unting Office, The Low-Intensity Threat is 
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